Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark?

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Cultural racism has found fertile territory in a post-industrial Europe experiencing economic crisis and social disintegration, but its manifestations vary between countries. Denmark, a country traditionally regarded as liberal and tolerant, experienced a fundamental shift in attitude during the early 1980s that has seen it emerge potentially as one of the most racist countries in Europe. Paradoxically, liberal values are used as justification for negative representations of ‘others’. This paper examines the place-specific manifestations of cultural racism in Denmark, which can be identified as essentially anti-Muslim and anti-refugee. Through the use of interviews with minority women, newspaper extracts and material propagated by far-right organizations, the paper traces the evolution of this discourse, identifying its key actors as: specific far-right anti-immigration groups; the media; and a culturally deterministic academic research tradition. The subtle manifestation of cultural racism in Denmark, coupled with inadequate anti-racist opposition or legislation, have rendered it particularly damaging, and ‘legitimated’ a range of racist policies and practices.

Key words: ‘race’, nation, cultural racism, nationalism, Denmark.

Introduction

Globalization and economic integration are creating powerful homogenizing pressures throughout the world, but paradoxically, this has been associated with revival in the emphasis of cultural differences in many places (Castles, Kalantzis, Cope and Morrissey 1988). While European integration is creating a Europe without internal borders, there has been growing tension around the concepts of ‘race’ and nation, as the nation state loses some of its functions, and suffers from a crisis of legitimacy. This has manifested in different ways, with some nation states experiencing a resurgence of separatist nationalism, while others attempt to unify the crumbling nation state by relying on powerful ideologies of nationalism, strengthening national identity through the projection of cultural homogeneity, and asserting the boundedness of culture and exclusion of ‘others’. These processes have been closely associated with the development of a new form of racism, cultural racism. This paper will examine the characteristics of cultural racism and its links to nationalism, tracing its evolution in Western Europe. However, there are certain place-specific ways in which this racism
has manifested and the case of Denmark will be examined to demonstrate this.

Danish society has traditionally regarded itself as liberal and tolerant, placing a high value on social equality and social cohesion, promoted through a well-developed welfare state. It has nurtured a long-standing interest in global humanitarian issues, an image which was reified during World War II, when a co-ordinated effort by the Danish resistance and ordinary Danes helped the Jewish population to escape to neutral territory in Sweden. However, Denmark has not escaped the recent wave of racism and xenophobia that has swept over continental Europe, and commentators have observed a fundamental shift in attitude since the early 1980s, a change that Hjarnø predicted ‘could see Denmark emerge as one of the most racist countries in Western Europe’ (1991: 75). This paper will draw on a range of relevant sources including: in-depth interviews with migrant women, newspaper extracts and material propagated by Danish far-right anti-immigration groups, to trace changes in attitude, and examine the validity of the assertion by Horst (1983) that racism has become an integral part of the system in Denmark. It is the aim to demonstrate that cultural racism has certain place-specific characteristics related to the nature and timing of immigration, and can broadly be defined in the Danish context as anti-Muslim and anti-refugee.

Theories of racism

Before examining racism in the Danish context, it is necessary to examine theories of racism. The term ‘race’ signifies the pseudo-scientific division of all humans into distinct categories based on skin colour, each having particular associated character traits, and it is the inherent ‘inferiority’ of particular ‘racial’ groups which has historically served as justification for their subjugation. The term came into common usage in the English language during the late eighteenth century, but originated during the earlier colonial period when it was utilized as a means for political and social organization and domination (Miles 1982). It is argued that the concept is a social construction with no biological or scientific basis (Brah 1993; Smith 1989), that the use of racial distinctions is essentially related to forms of social relations at historically specific times and to the ways in which these relations maintain fundamental inequalities in power (Hall 1978). Racism and associated practices of discrimination are integral to the capitalist system, but rest on ideological arguments and theory (Blaut 1992). Racism is therefore not a static phenomenon, but one that is renewed and transformed:

Racism does not stay still; it changes shape, size, contours, purpose, function— with changes in the economy, the social structure, the system and, above all, the challenges, the resistances to that system. (Sivananadan 1983: 2)

E ven if all of the roots are torn out, the vine will not wither: it will grow other roots, a new theory of racism, unless racism is attacked, not as theory but as practice. (Blaut 1992: 298)

Blaut (1992) traced the evolution of racism through its various transformations, from religious racism in the early nineteenth century, to biological racism during the mid-nineteenth century, and to its current form, cultural racism.

Early forms of racism

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, most racist practice in Europe and its
colonies was grounded in religion, being based on the perceived cultural superiority of Christendom. The division of people on this basis was therefore supernaturally ordained and immutable and was used as justification for the exploitation of colonized peoples on a global scale (Blaut 1992). The mid-nineteenth century saw secularization of the intellectual environment rendering religious racism untenable, and it became necessary to place racist practice in a new theoretical context that could accommodate new scientific developments. At this time, the study of difference among humans became confused with Darwinian theories of human evolution, and explicitly biological ideas regarding a biotic struggle for survival between different species were extended to the social sphere, where a similar struggle was seen to occur within the human species (Jackson and Penrose 1993). Physical human traits, particularly skin pigmentation, were given scientific status by theorists such as Gobineau, with some traits being assigned an inferior status. Racism thus became grounded in natural science, where explicitly biological theories based on the genetic superiority of the white ‘race’ were used to justify social divisions within the rigid class structure of Victorian society. The perceived biological and therefore moral and cultural superiority of white Europeans justified the categorization of black people as a labouring class (Smith 1989), either in the metropolitan core or in peripheral colonies. Nineteenth-century scientific racism thus legitimated class inequality and economic exploitation of certain ‘racial’ groups by attributing particular intellectual and social defects to them (Stolcke 1995).

The development of new intellectual theories and the rise of socialism during the twentieth century refuted the existence of distinct races, and biological racism lost currency. Thus new ideological justification was required to explain and perpetuate continuing inequalities in wealth between the core and periphery, and the continued exploitation of the periphery by the core; and much later, to justify increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Fortress Europe.

Cultural racism

Cultural racism, a refined replacement of earlier biological racism, served this purpose. It evolved from modernization theory, and the associated assumption that nearly all significant cultural innovations emanate from Europe (Blaut 1992), thus relying on history rather than biology or religion to explain the ‘superiority’ of Europeans, who could be defined as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’, in contrast to non-Europeans as ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’, an idea which has become particularly popular in Scandinavia (Alund 1991). The essence of cultural racism therefore is that Europeans are not racially, but culturally superior. The theory can be traced to Fanon (1967), but was not widely used until defined in the British context by Barker (1981), whose ground-breaking work during the 1970s and 1980s defined cultural racism as a theory of human nature where humans are considered equal, but where cultural differences make it natural for nation states to form closed communities, as relations between different cultures are essentially hostile. This theory therefore rests on constructions of the nation as a bounded cultural entity.

Sivananadan (1983) argues that forms of racial discrimination are closely linked to different stages in capitalist development. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, economic restructuring and movement of capital to the developing world was thought to have ended Western Europe’s need for importation of labour, rendering former post-war labour mi-
grants external to the needs of their economies. Subsequent immigration debates evolved into discussion of issues of exclusion and repatriation, in direct contrast to the reality of continued family reunification and refugee migration in most countries. If this now externalized ‘other’ could be defined as inherently different in terms of culture, its ‘natural home’ could therefore be perceived as being out with Britain or Europe, thereby justifying new restrictive immigration policies (Barker 1981; Miles 1989). Images were evoked of British culture being ‘swamped’ by immigrants (Miles and Phizacklea 1984), a situation which would ‘inevitably’ lead to cultural conflict.

Cultural racism as a discourse performs the same task as biological racism, as culture functions in the same way as nature, creating closed and bounded cultural groups. However, while biological racism legitimated the use of migrant labourers for menial work within core countries or their colonies, based on their genetic inferiority, cultural racism conveniently legitimates the exclusion of ‘others’ on the basis that they are culturally different, and that their presence in core countries will inevitably lead to conflict. This externalization and ‘othering’ process is part of this new racist discourse, which serves the dominant structures of power by justifying exclusion and glossing over issues of social and economic inequality by cloaking discussion of these issues in ‘cultural difference’ (Molina and Tesfahuney 1995).

Constructions of ‘race’ and nation

Nationalist ideologies have been central to all racist discourses, and are an essential component of cultural racism because of the degree to which they embody the idea of ‘race’ and legitimize this through the granting or withholding of citizenship and its associated benefits (Jackson and Penrose 1993). The concept of the nation state as a cultural entity was pioneered in Europe, and formed a key part of European nationalist ideologies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Anderson (1991), whose ideas have formed the basis of many recent theories of nationalism, describes the nation as a culturally grounded, imagined political community, where all the members are perceived to have common interests, although most will never meet or know of the existence of other members. Miles builds on Anderson’s concept and describes a process of nationalization, where ‘a particular territorially bound, but culturally diverse and class—and gender—divided population is mobilized to develop a sense of “belonging”, of membership, of a nation state’ (1993: 208). Miles links the concepts of ‘race’ and nation, asserting that ‘[r]acism is the lining of the cloak of nationalism which surrounds and defines the boundaries of England as an imagined community’ (1987: 38). By imagining a territorially bound community with a ‘common interest’, there must, by implication, also be ‘others’ who do not share the ‘common interest’ and should be excluded. Cultural racism thus relies on the closure of culture by territory and the idea that ‘foreigners’ should not share the ‘national’ resources, particularly if they are under threat of scarcity (Stolcke 1995). It stereotypes ethnic groups, regarding culture as fixed and bounded in a permanent way, thus denying the permeability of borders and the possibility of adaptation strategies and cultural hybridity (Pred 1998), resulting in the use of terms such as ‘foreigners’, ‘aliens’ and ‘strangers’ as descriptors of externalized ‘others’. National identity, and the way this is expressed, is therefore a crucial factor determining the ways in which cultural racism has gained a foothold in various European nation states. Countries such as Denmark, which rely on a perceived culturally homogenous national
identity, have therefore provided fertile territory for cultural racism, with immigration being construed as a threat to national identity.

**Cultural racism in Denmark**

The manifestations of cultural racism are broadly similar throughout Europe (Pieterse 1991), but the timing of immigration and particular forms of nationalist identity have varied by country, resulting in place-specific variations in the way cultural racism has evolved. This section will examine the particular conditions that have promoted the development and sustenance of cultural racism in Denmark, and the ways in which this has informed racist practice.

The religious and intellectual contexts that shaped early European racisms were as relevant to Denmark as they were to Britain. Denmark engaged with the slave trade in much the same exploitative manner as other European economies; however, the scale of the trade was relatively minor, and was less important to the Danish economy. Plantation regimes in Danish territories, such as St Thomas in the Caribbean, were relatively harsh and brutal, but were at that time seen as necessary and ‘natural’, justified on the basis of religious racism (Bro-Jørgensen 1966). Curiously though, the situation in Greenland (also a Danish colony) at that time contrasted sharply to the slave plantations. A strange paternalism characterized Denmark’s policy towards Greenland, placing the interests of the indigenous inhabitants above those of economic exploitation. Greenland was effectively preserved as a living museum, where the Inuit population were isolated from the rest of the world until World War II.

In the absence of any significant non-white immigration to Denmark prior to the 1960s, this paternalistic approach to non-whites in general was maintained, where other cultures were essentially regarded as ‘curiosities’. This perspective is reflected in what Schwartz (1985: 10) perceives as a ‘naivety’ expressed within the ‘Danish literary and philosophical imagination’, which he argues, also pervades Danish society and culture. This is evident in the account of one of the earliest female Turkish women in Denmark, who, when interviewed (by the author of this paper), described her experience on arrival in Copenhagen during the early 1970s:

It was a bit strange and there were hardly any foreign workers and dark-haired people and such like, so they thought we looked very nice and we got sweets and we got money and we got bikes and we got clothes and everyone clapped their hands because we looked so nice. It was a lovely time the first two years. (Selda)

As stated, Denmark has projected a particularly liberal and tolerant outlook to the world, and has been very active in the promotion of humanitarian activity ‘elsewhere’ in the world. However, a less discussed aspect of Scandinavian history involved the practice of state-sanctioned ‘ethnic hygiene’, where sterilization programmes were implemented to improve racial and genetic purity. This occurred primarily in Sweden from the 1930s, but also on a smaller scale in Denmark until the 1960s (Bates 1999; Roll-Hansen 1989). Another little-discussed facet of the World War II Danish resistance movement was its essentially nationalistic character, a factor currently played upon by the far right, many of whose older activists were involved in the resistance. Despite these factors, Scandinavia has generally constructed itself as an icon of modern liberal and progressive social values, with social cohesion and equality being promoted through extremely comprehensive welfare provision. This has involved the
development of a very strong bureaucracy, and a high degree of institutionalization of welfare functions (Vestergaard 1998). But this image of an enlightened and tolerant people is becoming increasingly incongruous with current ‘reality’ in Denmark. Despite relatively modest levels of immigration, it is argued that cultural racism has found particularly fertile territory there, and in the absence of significant public scrutiny, has become institutional, part of the very fabric of Danish society (Hjarnø 1991; Horst 1983; Schierup 1993). Public racist slurs have become commonplace (and legally tolerated), and political parties across the spectrum have adopted cultural racism as an integral part of their platforms, to the extent that it is no longer necessary to have extreme right-wing parties promoting anti-immigration views. This racism has been grounded in various forms of racist practice, including the adoption of discriminatory housing quotas for ethnic minorities (based around the concept of a 10 per cent ‘tolerance threshold’) in some areas (see Wren 1997) and compulsory refugee dispersal which operates along similar lines (see Wren 1999). These developments have largely occurred in the absence of any coherent and effective anti-racist legislation.

Jackson and Penrose (1993) remind us that phenomena we consider ‘natural’ and ‘common sense’ are embedded in the dominant ideologies of the societies within which we live, a factor which becomes particularly salient when conducting research in a foreign country. Billig discusses the ways in which ideology operates to make people oblivious to the historical constructions that have created the nation states within which they live, and the ‘reassuring normality’ which expressions of ‘banal nationalism’ embody (1995: 7). As Foucault (1980) argues, every society has its ‘truth’, and predominant discourses are recognized as such, but ‘truth’ and power cannot be separated, as facts acquire their concrete meaning from the language in which they are spoken, and are formed as justification for the exercise of power. Clearly, there was a time when the co-existence of Danes and migrant workers was unproblematic (see quote from ‘Selda’ above); this was also a time when migrant labour was integral to the requirements of an expanding Danish economy. The process of externalization and subsequent ‘othering’ of migrants and refugees as surplus to the needs of the Danish economy began during the early 1980s after the demand for migrant labour had receded, and it was at this time that a ‘problematic’ discourse emerged. This ‘othering’ process was central to the mechanisms of capitalism in much the same way as Foucault’s (1978) analysis of processes during the seventeenth century, when sexual activity outwith the sphere of reproduction of labour was repressed, and problematized as ‘deviant’. This process was bolstered by the role of science which ‘stirred up people’s fears’ (Foucault 1978: 53), an analogy which could easily be applied to the role of social science and the various forms of social engineering and control of minorities (outlined above) that it ‘justifies’ in Denmark.

Critical questions aimed at the bearers of the current new-racist discourse in Denmark were frequently met with responses such as, ‘[y]ou just don’t understand the problems in our society because you don’t live here’, or ‘but we have so many immigrants here’, as if this was the only country to experience immigration, unemployment and the social disintegration associated with economic restructuring. What has made cultural racism in Denmark so damaging is its subtle and almost invisible character. It is easily absorbed into the predominant ideologies of a country which imagines a homogeneous past and present, a country which has historically promoted humanitarian causes elsewhere and social equality at home, and
where no overt right-wing violence, and no explicitly biological forms of racism exist (the term ‘race’ is not used in Denmark). Cultural racism can be easily framed within predominant discourses of a highly progressive welfare state, and in a country where relative sexual equality allows the demonization of other ‘backward’ cultures in their midst which are perceived to oppress their women.

This process of ‘othering’ can be followed in the chronology of the terms used to describe immigrants and their offspring in Denmark. Early government reports referred to labour migrants as gæstearbejdere (guest workers), implying a temporary stay, or as fremmedarbejdere, a term whose subsequent derivative, de fremmede, has become a blanket term used to describe all ethnic minorities in Denmark and can loosely be translated as ‘the strangers’. These terms have been borrowed directly from German usage and can be traced to the period of Nazi rule in Germany, where the term gastarbeiter was used as Nazi party propaganda to promote acceptance of foreign workers in order to increase productivity (Rhoades 1978). Both Germany and Denmark share this unfortunate beginning to their modern immigration histories, and continued usage of the term de fremmede by the Danish public signifies non-acceptance of the permanent status of most of Denmark’s immigrants. It is also applied to second and third generation immigrants born in Denmark, despite the fact that they speak perfect Danish and are often Danish citizens. The label is seemingly used to describe people who appear ‘different’, a visible ‘other’ who are effectively permanent ‘strangers’ and apparently cannot adapt to a ‘modern’ society because of their different culture. Visible biological criteria thus function as markers for various forms of institutional discrimination. These terms have now been dropped from official reports and replaced by the term indvandrer (immigrant), signifying that the authorities, at least, recognize that most immigrants do intend to remain, although the term indvandrer is still widely used in non-official contexts to describe second and third generation migrants. Repeated calls for the use of the term ‘ethnic minorities’, implying participation and inclusion and the right to protection from discrimination, have led to its adoption by some researchers and official bodies, but as yet, the term is rarely heard among the general public.

The ways in which cultural racism has been articulated in Denmark are similar to the Thatcherite anti-immigration rhetoric in 1980s Britain, as public discourses have consistently portrayed Denmark as a country overrun with foreigners. The same culturally deterministic arguments have evolved in Denmark, focusing on the potential destruction of Danish culture, arguments that focus on the boundedness of culture and deny the permeability of such boundaries. The ethnic minorities have become scapegoats for economic problems associated with economic restructuring, but in Denmark this connection has been particularly prominent due to the relative lateness of labour migration, coinciding with the 1973 oil crisis, which affected Denmark particularly badly. Both Denmark and Sweden operated relatively liberal refugee policies until the mid-1980s, resulting in the presence of significant numbers of refugees from Muslim-majority countries. Immigration has therefore been perceived specifically as a ‘Muslim invasion’, primarily of refugees, augmenting earlier labour migration also from Muslim-majority countries. This has nurtured a pre-existing anti-Muslim discourse as in Sweden (Pred 1998), and the demonization of Muslims. The place-specific form of cultural racism in Denmark is therefore distinctly anti-Muslim, stirring up a centuries-old European discourse of a ‘civilized’, ‘modern’, Europe pitted against
an imagined ‘other’, the Islamic world, portrayed as ‘barbaric’, ‘tyrannical’ and ‘fundamentalist’ (Miles 1989), a discourse which conveniently ignores a European history riddled with war, totalitarianism and fascism (Pieterse 1991). This anti-Muslim discourse is accentuated by perceived sexism, a phenomenon noted by Wallerstein (1990), where Western values are regarded as universal, and Islamic women are therefore perceived as being oppressed both by their religion and by their men, serving as further justification for discrimination. In the light of the achievements made by the feminist movement in Scandinavia, this argument is particularly vociferous in the Danish context.

Due to the contested nature of racism and the associated difficulty in applying a universal definition, it is difficult to apply any meaningful quantitative measures that could allow international comparison. Various surveys on racism have provided contradictory conclusions, as few of these surveys define racism clearly. However, bearing this in mind, it may be useful to refer to some specific studies conducted in Denmark. A study by Enoch found 30 per cent of the sample surveyed ‘expressed some degree of anti-foreign worker prejudice’ (1994: 295). Another survey quoted by Rosling and Yilmaz (1993) found only 15 per cent of the sample to be hostile to foreigners, while a European Union (EU) survey of all 12 countries carried out in 1988 ranked Denmark as having the most negative attitude towards its ethnic minorities (Rosling and Yilmaz 1993). Such quantitative surveys do not tell us much about the intensity of the negative feelings or the ways in which they are articulated. In Denmark, such negative orientations have been allowed to grow unchecked by any coherent form of anti-racist legislation. Discrimination on the basis of ‘race’ is illegal (Racial Discrimination Act, Law no. 289 9 June 1971), but this is only defined within very limited parameters, and does not include labour market discrimination (Rosling and Yilmaz 1993) or acts of discrimination by government departments and public authorities (Wilkie 1990). It is also considered within the most trivial category of offences, being dealt with by the police and not the Director of Public Prosecutions (Wilkie 1990). The law also exempts conversations that form part of an objective debate, both in the public and private spheres (Rosling and Yilmaz 1993), which effectively excludes the media from any form of legal liability. Discrimination against ethnic minorities is also permitted when it is perceived to be in their own interests (Wilkie 1990). Until recently, there has been no body to oversee the application of these laws, or to inform ethnic minorities about their rights, although in 1994 an equivalent to the British Commission for Racial Equality, Nævnet for Etniske Ligestilling, was established, demonstrating some recognition that there is a problem.

The populist discourse and Danish nationalism

Cultural racism and the problematization of ethnic minorities in Denmark has been associated with the strengthening in the public imagination of the concept of a homogeneous Danish culture, perceived as a historically rooted set of traditions now under threat from globalization, the EU, and from ‘alien’ cultures. This fear has been carefully nurtured by public speeches and statements from right-wing politicians and prominent public figures. Anderson’s (1991) concept of the nation state as an ‘imagined community’ is particularly relevant in the Danish context, where the construction of Denmark as a culturally homogeneous nation has been bolstered by a range of practices. External
observers may wonder at the frequent use of the national flag both in daily contexts, and as a symbolic marker during festivities (see Figures 1 and 2), and also the prevalence of the colours red and white in many everyday contexts, including newspaper lettering, road signs, Christmas decorations, art, and even clothing and kitchen linen. Red and white are very much part of everyday life, to the extent that this colour combination seems natural and is not noticed. In this way, the nation is flagged on a continual basis, and such ‘routine nationalism’ (Billig 1995: 35) ensures that the concept of the Danish nation is unconsciously present among its citizens. This flagging is closely tied in with the concepts of home and garden (many contain flags), hospitality and comfort, all key symbols of ‘Danishness’.

Danish nationalism experienced a reawakening during the 1970s as a reaction to the perceived threats of European integration and immigration. This was expressed through Grundtvig’s (1983 [1838]) ideal of Denmark as a small power with a large spirit under threat from outside influences. It is worth noting that historically Denmark has lost territory to Swe-
den, Norway and Germany, and has, in the past, been dominated socially and culturally by the influence of Germany. This vulnerability has been played on by far-right critics of immigration: ‘the smaller a country, the easier it is to overrun it. That’s why one has to be extra careful in small states’ (Glistrup 1991: 245). It is argued by historians that Danish national identity developed at a very early stage in reaction to historical social and cultural dominance by Germans resident in Denmark (Feldbæk, 1982). This strong sense of national identity based on common language and history has endured, and has been reinforced by factors such as the German occupation during World War II.

From tolerance to hostility

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that a culturally racist discourse did not emerge in Denmark until the 1980s, and that during the early days of labour migration, when full employment existed and labour migrants were perceived as a temporary stop-gap, relations between the majority and minorities were reasonably good. Interviewees gave personal accounts of this change in perception. The early account given by Selda (see above) contrasts starkly with current experiences among migrants:

Danes are not as nice as they once were, and open
towards immigrants, refugees or dark-haired people. They were then. There was nothing like, ‘Ah, here comes a dark-haired person, so we must say something, or go the other way, or push’, or such like. There is today. (Lubna)

I have heard, I know some Iraqis who have lived in Denmark for sixteen or seventeen years and they have said to me that the Danes were different once. They were friendly when they saw foreigners, there weren’t many foreigners. But they say foreigners, they have organized magazines, plays and other things. But there are many foreigners in Denmark now and they are not all good. There are some we have met in the centres who are very bad. They steal, they cause trouble, they cause problems. So the Danes say that all foreigners are bad, but that is not true. It is only a few who make trouble, who steal, and I think because of that, Danes don’t like foreigners. (Khadija)

Mostly it is older people, old women and men. They can see you coming, but they won’t move aside, and you can’t really move yourself, so you go straight past, but they push anyway, and shout a whole lot of things, you are black and things like that. When I answer, it is a surprise for them that I can speak fluent Danish … I answer them, I don’t just look at them, because then they don’t experience that people who wear the chador can speak Danish. They maybe think they are just scroungers who come wearing the chador and won’t learn Danish … Sometimes they answer back, ‘So, you speak Danish?’ It is such a surprise for them because they don’t know any immigrants and refugees. But there are also some who don’t care whether you can speak Danish. ‘Why are you wearing a veil?’ or ‘Why do you have dark hair?’ (Lubna)

If you send a job application and they can see a foreign name, they say, ‘The job has already been taken’, and it isn’t, and you can see it advertised again. It happens a lot with immigrants and refugees, where they can’t get anything, and they have good qualifications, much better than any of the Danish applicants, but they don’t get the job. The young second-generation Pakistanis have difficulty getting practical training placements. (Lubna)

I remember once when I went to interview for a job and I took the bus. Then I met an old lady, she was Arabic. She was looking for a place, so she talked to me … I tried to explain to her and I went past the stop where I was going because I was talking with the lady. Then I get to be late. I asked the driver, ‘Could you please tell me where this is? I have address, could you please help me with the address? I am late you know, but I didn’t realise because I was speaking’. He didn’t want to answer, and then I thought he didn’t hear me, and I said, ‘Please can you help me? Where is this address?’ And he just said like this (shrugs shoulders). Then I understood. I was really upset. I just go like this to the driver (raises middle finger). And then I went to the interview. I was five minutes late. They told me at the interview, ‘You can make another appointment’. I was really, really sad. (Nana)

I work with older folk who say things like, ‘So, here comes the little black negro’, and they look, but I don’t perceive that as racism, it is only natural. (Haua)

A woman who migrated from Yemen in 1990 expected Denmark to be a very cosmopolitan place, but was taken aback:

I don’t think the Danish people are used to the foreigners. No, they are not. I’ve been travelling in Europe before and they are used to the foreigners there, so when I came to Denmark it was … you know … I thought they also know the foreigners, but some people, they are very rude and some people they are nice. Some people, they are extremely rude. I was working for a cleaning company and the boss, she didn’t like foreigners, so I get some problems, then I get fired. (Nana)
This fundamental shift in attitude occurred during the early 1980s, a period of relatively severe economic crisis and unemployment, but also of relatively relaxed refugee legislation. It was commonly perceived that refugees were benefiting from Denmark’s generous welfare provision, while many Danes were suffering economically. Refugees and ethnic minorities generally became the scapegoats in an emerging racist discourse, being viewed not only as external to the needs of the Danish economy, but also as a financial and social burden.

The origins and development of cultural racism in Denmark

Various factors have contributed to the development of a culturally racist discourse in Denmark, and a variety of actors have been involved, including the media, far-right immigration groups and local politicians, but Schierup (1993) traces its origins to the culturalist bias of academic research, which has been very closely connected with public policy, and has provided the foundation for a range of concepts which have legitimated and nurtured cultural racism. Jackson (1989) claims that the work of uncritical social scientists often reflects, perpetuates and legitimizes racist categories, and racism in general. In Britain, research during the 1970s tended to problematize New Commonwealth immigrants without examining the structures of the society within which they lived (Jackson and Penrose 1993), a situation later mirrored in France (Grillo 1985) and Norway (Salimi 1991). This process has also occurred in Denmark, where research on ethnic minorities has been focused on the theme of indvandrerproblematikken (the immigrant problem). This term was first used in an influential report published in 1983 by a committee which was to determine future research directions in this field (Udvalget vedrørende indvandrerforskning 1983), and appears since then to have become rooted in the consciousness of the majority of policy makers and researchers. Schierup (1993) claims that this perception of ethnic minorities as a ‘problem’ now represents the dominant way of thinking among the Danish authorities. Ethnic minority research has consistently been framed within a culturalist bias, with minimal emphasis on the social structures of the societies within which ethnic minorities live. Danish research also lacked a broader scope, which could encompass the context of international migration at a global scale, as well as examining the power relationships within its own society. As Katz argues:

It is no longer possible to claim to represent another cultural group without at least referring to the uneven power relationships that bind it to global capitalism at an historically specific time and in a geographically specific place. (1992: 498)

Coherent and critical analysis of the nature of racism and discrimination in Denmark has also been notably absent, and the liberal-professional establishment oriented to anti-racism has been significantly weaker than in Britain, providing no realistic opposition to the emerging racist discourse (Lindstrøm 1992; Schierup 1993).

Schwartz (a Danish-American outsider to the Danish research scene) was well aware of the above problems, being one of the few academics to question predominant academic discourses:

Research and policy—when it is a question of immigrants—try to fit each other like a glove fits a hand. A few researchers, myself included, have called into question the theory and practice of integration, but to do so in the present context results in self-mar-
ginalizing. Science about immigrants and the immigrant problem has moved from a study of ‘social conditions’ to one of ‘cultural collisions’. That transition means that the burden of the problem lies in the cultural traditions which the immigrants have brought with them to contemporary Denmark … [t]hus, a history of research about the guest worker/immigrant problem reflects, and better yet, refracts the institutions and power structure of Danish society. ‘The problem’ as it is defined in the medium of social research separates into different tones and temperaments. The change in research indicates subtly and surely the transformation of Danish society and its crisis. (1985: 21)

Schwartz’s claims are supported by ethnic minority intellectuals such as Hussain (1991), who argues that Danish migration research is ethnocentric and lacking a realistic understanding of the situation, focusing on stereotypical cultural differences and ignoring the wider societal context within which ethnic minorities live. Schwartz argued that racism in advanced capitalist societies was the ‘problem’ that should be researched, but his views were not taken on board by the Danish academic establishment at the time because they were in direct contradiction with the predominant social science discourse, which has prevailed into the 1990s. The apparent inability of ethnic minorities to achieve labour market participation and economic equality can now conveniently be blamed on their ‘culture’. The problematization of ethnic minorities has also acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as constructions of ‘reality’ can easily become real in their consequences.

The role of the far-right

The far-right in Denmark has played a very active role in the creation of negative constructions of ‘others’, particularly Muslims and refugees. A variety of anti-immigration organizations have exploited visions of a homogeneous Danish nation state to achieve their goals. Most are extremist groups with minimal influence, but others have been more successful in marketing their ideas to the Danish public; rather than give a review of all groups, those with influence will be examined in more detail.

Within the political sphere, the Progress Party, and its offshoot, The Danish People’s Party, have been the most vociferous anti-immigration parties. The Progress Party was originally a populist, anti-tax party, and its leader, Mogens Glistrup, has become a role model and ideological figurehead for the skinhead movement (Thorup 1997). The Progress Party has not made any serious inroads into the political scene, but The Danish People’s Party has been more successful, gaining 7 per cent of the total vote in the 1998 general election (see Institute of Race Relations, <http://www.irr.org.uk/europe/>). The most significant anti-immigration movement has been a grassroots organization Den Danske Forening (DDF) (The Danish Society), which evolved from a protest group, The Committee Against Refugee Law, in 1986. Its most prominent and articulate member, Søren Krarup (a priest), has now become a media celebrity due to his outspoken views on immigration, and claims to have the popular support of a ‘silent majority’ in Denmark (Krarup 1987: 49). He has enjoyed extensive press coverage, appearing in the newspapers at least on a weekly basis (Thorup 1997), and interprets his apparent support across the social spectrum as a ‘popular rebellion’ against the ‘tyranny’ of the liberal establishment (Krarup 1987: 101). Refugees have remained the specific target of Den Danske Forening, which is against formynderi, ‘the use of bureaucratic power by an enlightened moral elite’ (Sampson 1995: 61), with Danish welfare bureaucracy apparently constituting the biggest
threat to ‘Danishness’: ‘The Refugee Council has in recent years played a tyrannical role in relation to the Danish population ... from being a charity to an increasing degree, a powerful state within a state’ (Krarup 1987: 10). Such a view is supported by others on the right:

The Danish Refugee Council have degenerated into a manipulative, power-hungry mafia, which self-sufficiently blood-sucks, pesters and torments the Danish population in the dirtiest way possible: By pushing weak people in front of themselves to secure their own bread and butter, while simultaneously terrorising Den Danske Forening ... (Glistrup 1991: 189)

Unlike Glistrup, Krarup cleverly avoids any references to biological racism or to extreme or insulting viewpoints, preferring to stick to more pleasant and familiar concepts that are perceived to characterize ‘Danishness’:

For more than a thousand years we have, in this country, formed a nation with a common religion, language, culture and history, and this national community cannot just be flicked aside as something trivial, because economic or ideological interests dictate they should. One shouldn’t do it. Love of fatherland and home is one of the loveliest human emotions to be found, closely connected with honesty and decency—and an old nation state represents a home. Here the family or people have their sanctuary and their community. That doesn’t mean one can’t have guests. Neither does it mean one cannot open one’s doors for the needy or give them permanent residence. But if one doesn’t recognise the difference between hosts and guests through transforming the family home to an official hotel, then one is attacking the family and the home and simultaneously laying the foundations for a large array of conflicts, which definitely will not, and cannot be peaceful. The difference must be recognised—the difference between home and hotel, between Danes and strangers, between Christians and Mohammedans [sic]. The difference must be both recognised and respected. (Krarup jylland’s Posten August 1984 as quoted in Schierup 1993: 161)

Krarup plays on the vision of Denmark as a unified, homogeneous Christian nation state, where the home and garden, hospitality and invitation are central images, a world in which migrant workers and refugees can only ever be ‘guests’, their continued presence being perceived as a threat to the Danish ‘home’ (Sampson 1995). This vision also creates an analogy between the wartime German occupation and the current perceived ‘invasion’ of Muslims:

I am a child of the occupation. From the autumn 1942, my parents had to go underground to participate in the resistance against the Germans, and like many other children from the occupation, I formed an indelible impression of what our country’s freedom and independence means. (Krarup 1987: 8)

In a vicarage in the middle of Denmark, the Committee against the Refugee Law was to meet for the first time in person to plan the future battle against refugee policy. We soon began to feel like a ‘freedom committee’ was meeting. The persecution we experienced from officialdom in Denmark gave us a feeling of illegality reminiscent of the conditions under the (German) occupation. (Krarup 1987: 59)

Krarup’s regular press appearances have been instrumental in changing the public perception of Den Danske Forening from a fringe right-wing group to a credible organization. Den Danske Forening has been an extremely effective organ for the dissemination of cultural racism, initiating anti-immigration campaigns and encouraging its members to flood the newspapers with anti-immigration letters. Weekendavisen recently undertook an investigation into the volume of anti-immigration let-
ters appearing in newspapers, and revealed that an apparent ‘tidal wave’ of protest against immigration in reality constituted a relatively modest number of DDF activists (Thorup 1997). Quraishy and O’Connor (1991) argue that Den Danske Forening has had a significant influence on the views of the general public as its campaigns have induced several newspapers to adopt an anti-immigrant stance, and it managed to mobilize sufficient support and political influence to persuade the government to adopt a more restrictive refugee policy in 1986. Crucially, DDF ideology, which was once very much on the fringes of Danish politics, has introduced concepts now accepted within mainstream political parties, viewpoints that are now in acceptable everyday use.

By the mid-1980s, an extremely polarized anti-Muslim, anti-refugee discourse had become firmly rooted in the public domain in Denmark. Glistrup, in his now infamous speech, described the Muslim presence in Denmark as ‘a drop of arsenic in a glass of clear water’. He also uses terms such as ‘colonization’ (1991: 5) and ‘fremmed invasion’ (invasion of strangers) (1991: 140) and employs scare-tactics to present a scenario whereby Muslim immigration is perceived as a deliberate strategy to ‘colonize’ Denmark and initiate a jihad (holy war):³

The real truth is that muhammedism [sic] is a destructive movement and muhammedans [sic] are a strongly visionary group, who have, in over a thousand years of action, demonstrated that their self-assured hatefulness is deadly serious. (Glistrup 1991: 277)

The threat against Denmark’s survival is the indifference whether the muhammedan [sic] avant garde is here illegally, as asylum seekers, as foreign workers or as naturalised Danish citizens. The person does not change because legal hair-splitting sticks another label on him. (Glistrup 1991: 237)

The power to influence future development will quickly slip out of the hands of Danes with a large number of resident Iranians, Palestinians, Lebanese and other incomprehensibly gruesome holy-war-muhammedans [sic]. (Glistrup 1991: 285)

These views are supported by Krarup, who asserts the bounded nature of Christian and Muslim cultures:

The Mohammedan is a Mohammedan [sic]. That determines all his life and opinions. In Denmark we are Christians, and that determines all of our lives and opinions. How can Mohammedans and us be ‘integrated’ without stopping being ourselves? It is naturally impossible. It is an artificial product, which can only be found in politicians’ and planners’ square heads. In the real world one is either a Mohammedan or a Christian—and here in Denmark we are Christians. (Jylland Posten August 1984 as quoted in Schierup 1993: 163)

In this sense, religion and culture are inextricably linked, Denmark being defined as Christian, despite the fact that it is essentially a secular state. Islam is equated with a completely different cultural realm and perceived as incompatible with Christian (read Western) culture. This discourse thus builds on some of the key concepts of cultural racism:

If one meets with markedly different people, it is unavoidable that there will be trouble and misunderstandings, which will develop into friction, unrest and battles. It is basic human nature to be insecure, guarded and reserved towards the strangers and therefore the unknown. (Glistrup 1991: 174)

This understanding of culture, rooted in religion, is also linked to biological factors, as
culture can be brought to function like nature, being perceived as absolute and based on an unchangeable origin, and by inference, genetics (Schierup 1993). Glistrup’s statements echo this in his comments about Muslims: ‘the two cultures are like fire and water’ (1991: 252).

Within the Danish populist discourse, concepts of belonging and exclusion are territorially based, but in the eyes of the right, being born in Denmark does not appear to be sufficient criteria for inclusion in Danish society, and to the rights of citizenship, particularly if one appears ‘different’, as ‘inborn’ cultural attributes are applied. Effectively, this constitutes a ‘racism without race’, where ethnic minorities have been lumped together as an absolute and unchanging entity, which in Denmark’s case is a Muslim ‘other’, and negative evaluations about Muslims are then implicitly considered valid for other non-Muslim minority groups. Official reports augment this image by categorizing all immigrants and refugees (along with the unemployed and single parents) as ‘socially weak’, and on this basis they can be denied social housing in particular areas (Boligministeriet 1994). In this way, racist theory is of political significance because of the practices it informs.

**The role of the media**

Billig (1995) discusses the powerful role of newspapers generally in bolstering nationalism. In the absence of legal constraint, the Danish media have been a very effective vehicle for the propagation of the anti-immigration views of Den Danske Foreningen. Hussain, Yilmaz and O’Connor (1997) argue that since the early 1980s, the Danish press has consistently portrayed ethnic minorities in a negative light, and other studies have shown that the Danish media have persistently disseminated very negative and prejudiced images of Muslim immigrants in particular (Dindler and Olesen 1988). A UNESCO programme which monitored the Danish press over a prolonged period found it to have a very nationalistic and racist perspective (Hussain 1993). Quraishy, a leading spokesman for the ethnic minorities highlighted this problem:

Brøndby’s mayor Kjeld Rasmussen claims ‘Immigrants and refugees are a burden, scrounge from society, and that foreign families breed degenerate and handicapped children because of in-breeding’ … It would probably surprise most of Politiken’s readers, who probably believe that Denmark is one of the most tolerant countries in the world, to find out that in countries like England, Holland and even USA, that sort of statement would have serious legal consequences. The public reaction in these countries would also be much stronger than here. (1994: 4)

It is not possible to provide a thorough view of the role of the media here; however, some selected issues will be examined to convey the way in which published articles and letters have effectively ‘legitimated’ populist and racist views among the general public.

A recent media campaign run by *Ekstra Bladet* (tabloid newspaper) in 1997, which was designed to ‘open up’ debate about ethnic minorities in Denmark, demonstrated the above issues. Although the term *de fremmede* has been dropped from official reports, it remains in popular usage and formed the title of this campaign. Large posters featuring this title appeared in almost every public space in Denmark over a period of several weeks, inviting the public to write to *Ekstra Bladet* with their opinions about immigration and ethnic minorities. The campaign was extremely damaging to race relations as it provided a ‘legitimate’ public forum for many Danes to express racist
ideas, as a typical extract from a reader’s letter demonstrates: ‘Ekstra Bladet unfortunately is right in its criticism of refugees. It is good that it is now possible to say what one thinks without being called a racist’ (letter to Ekstra Bladet 14 April 1997: 22).

Although the readership of this tabloid is predominantly working class, and therefore represents a section of Danish society which has been adversely affected by economic restructuring, it has the largest readership of any newspaper, and the campaign had a much broader public audience, as a major part of it involved televised public debates featuring influential public figures. These televised debates echoed the general tone of the readers’ letters, and the campaign effectively ‘legitimated’ a new, openly racist ‘reality’, based on the premise that it represented the ‘popular opinion’, and freedom of expression.4 Freedom of expression is regarded as one of the cornerstones of Danish society, and it is generally felt that extremists’ viewpoints are best dealt with in an open and democratic forum. Clearly, in this case, such a forum has not been present, as newspapers which attempted to engage in balanced intellectual debate during the campaign were slammed for being out of touch with popular feeling and were accused of being:

A public demonstration organized by immigrant groups against the campaign was depicted as infringing the right of Danes to free speech and associated with book burning and religious fundamentalism, not as an expression of their right to free speech, which presumably should not exist because they are not Danish: I am very impressed with Ekstra Bladet’s campaign about the foreigners. On TV2, we got a clear example of where the limits are. Now the foreigners cannot accept that Ekstra Bladet is asking Danes for their opinions! What is the meaning of this? Now the limit has been breached. And with reference to the demonstration in Rådhuspladsen against Ekstra Bladet’s fine campaign, I am rather concerned about what will happen when the remaining 4 million Danes arrange a demonstration in favour of the campaign. (letter to Ekstra Bladet 14 April 1997: 22)

While debate about ethnic minorities has been very polarized, Lindstrøm (1992) argues that cultural racism has the edge in the debate, and has not been met with any significantly strong anti-racist resistance. As a ‘foreigner’ from a country with a more coherent sense of political correctness related to minority issues, and legislation to support this, I found it extremely difficult to use the Danish language as a medium of communication for discussing these issues with the Danish population, as the language has become so imbued with racist and exclusionary overtones. Bel Habib (1992) develops this argument, describing racism as a discourse built on a logic that most people are not conscious of when they make racist comments. He argues that it involves a language and a conceptualization of the world that most of us are not aware of, despite the fact that we all take part in it. It is therefore not a moral defect among individuals, but structured as an ‘unconscious grammar’ which affects thought and language at all levels of society (quoted in Schierup 1993: 154). One of the interviewees had a very clear and informed overview of the situation in Denmark that appeared to cut through the ‘unconscious grammar’ of cultural racism:

There are some people, who for example don’t like immigrants, often because of racism. Often, it’s
maybe because they haven’t got to know immigrants and refugees, and they look different. They look at their society, there are many unemployed, there are some refugees and immigrants who take their jobs, and they also think that they exploit their system. If you look at it in a different way, there are also Danes who are intelligent and think differently from the very closed people who believe everything they read in the newspapers… Sometimes the newspapers have written, for example, that there are immigrants who earn 20,000 kroner (ca St£2,000) a month in welfare benefits. They look at the worst cases, then they think that refugees are only immigrants exploiting their system. But if they could look more closely at the situation immigrants live in… or that there are also Danes who exploit the system. There are many Danes who earn many millions or they also exploit the tax system, but they don’t look at that. It is like Hans Christian Andersen’s The Ugly Duckling, the little black one, different and always a problem, that’s us. (Maha)

Conclusion

The development of cultural racism within Danish society has evolved from a complex interaction among a variety of actors, including academics, policy-makers, the media, far-right anti-immigration groups and individual local politicians using anti-immigrant manifestos to boost their popularity. The construction of immigrants as a ‘problem’ has become real in its consequences through informing generally racist practices within a variety of institutions. Social science research has provided the authorities and the public with negative and distorted images of ethnic minorities, images that have subsequently been reproduced in official reports. The media have played an important role, acting as a vehicle for the dissemination of the ‘unconscious grammar’ of cultural racism, primarily through letter-writing campaigns prompted by far-right groups such as Danske Forening. To an outsider, it appears that racism is everywhere, particularly in the media, but evidence has shown that this is a direct result of extremely clever marketing of xenophobic viewpoints from a relatively small, but very active group of people who have had a free reign in the press due to the absence of any sophisticated co-ordinated anti-racist opposition from the political left. This vacuum has been created by the involvement of the political left in a discourse which has constructed ethnic minorities, and in particular Muslim culture, as oppressive to women, thereby constituting a ‘threat’ to a society where gender equality is regarded as an important social and political achievement. However, the racialization of the Danish ethnic minority population has led to institutionalized racism, rampant labour market discrimination and extremely high levels of ethnic minority unemployment. Arguably, politicians have been too slow to react, and have done too little.

During the early days of labour migration, the needs of the Danish economy dictated the necessity of labour migration to maintain the general affluence of Danish society, and the Danes managed to maintain their tolerant reputation in the face of very modest levels of ‘temporary’ labour migration. However, as elsewhere, affluence was to be eroded by changes in the global economy, changes which also rendered former ‘guest workers’ as surplus to the needs of the Danish economy. The theory of cultural racism has found particularly fertile territory in Denmark, and has been expressed through a resurgence of Danish nationalism and the construction of Denmark as a homogeneous cultural entity. Justifications for cultural racism have been cloaked in an unconsciously racist logic, buttressed by traditionally liberal values such as freedom of speech (the freedom to voice racist opinions). This freedom has allowed public discourse to
breach boundaries that effectively infringe the rights of Denmark’s ethnic minority population, though within a populist discourse this is acceptable, as ethnic minorities are not perceived as entitled to share the rights of the native population. Danish society’s self-perception as a progressive country appears to legitimize the representation of Muslim groups in particular as the opposite, being targeted as ‘fundamentalists’, inherently incapable of ‘integrating’ into Danish society on account of their ‘backward’ culture. This anti-Muslim discourse and the actions of the Danish resistance during World War II are both facets of the same Danish nationalism, though with very different outcomes; but paradoxically, the very same Danish nationalism which fought against German fascism is now victimizing Muslims.

The various actors in the promotion of this discourse have had the latitude to operate without external restraint, due to the absence of significant representation of ethnic minorities in areas such as the media and local councils, and to the absence of any comprehensive and effective anti-racism legislation. It appears that the majority of the Danish population (including the liberal-professional establishment) are largely unaware of the subtle development of cultural racism in their society, accepting the predominant discourse that social inequalities between themselves and the ‘other’ are due to cultural factors that make it impossible for ethnic minorities to adapt. In this way, discussion about racism and discrimination can be avoided and marginalized. As in Sweden (Pred 1997), racism is externalized; it is something which happens ‘somewhere else’ and is perpetrated by ‘someone else’, presumably extremists. Hjarnø’s claim (see above) appears to be justified, particularly in the light of events during the recent election campaign, where immigration reform was a major issue, and was used as a platform by various political parties.

Refugees were the specific target, with Somalis taking the brunt of the hostility, prompting Somali representatives to complain to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) about the hostility expressed towards them and request placements in a more tolerant country (Dansk Flygtningehjælp 1998). This situation would have been unthinkable in the tolerant Denmark of the 1970s, and demonstrates the degree to which cultural racism has taken root there. The ‘unconscious grammar’ of cultural racism has become so ingrained in Danish society that the damage done over the last decade and a half would take at least a generation to repair, and it is perhaps the subtle and institutionalized nature of cultural racism in Denmark which renders it so damaging.

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Notes

1 The interviews referred to were conducted in 1995, and constituted part of the fieldwork for a PhD thesis. They were contextualized in informal participation in the social lives of migrant women in their community centres and homes over a whole summer. Using snowball-sampling methods from initial contacts in community centres, fifteen migrant women from a range of migrant-sender countries were interviewed with the aim of drawing out a wide range of issues related to their experiences after migration, of which racism and discrimination form an integral part. The interviews were in-depth, lasting for one to two hours and were carried out using a loosely constructed set of questions allowing flexibility
of responses, and the opportunity for the women to raise relevant issues which may not have been directly referred to in the questions. They were conducted in either English or Danish (without the use of interpreters), and where possible taped, though some interviewees expressed concern at having their interviews recorded and their responses were written down during the interview. All names have been changed to ensure anonymity.

2 With the exception of Greenlanders. The total population of Greenland is only 56,000, and potential migration from Greenland is not regarded as numerically significant, demonstrated by the automatic citizenship rights Greenlanders enjoy in Denmark.

3 Glistrup has never been charged for breaching the anti-racism law, despite the fact that he openly admits breaching it.

4 A freedom of expression which has attracted international criticism for not dealing with foreign neo-Nazis who take advantage of the lax laws in Denmark for propagating their material.

5 Ethnic minority unemployment levels in Denmark (along with Sweden and Norway) are the highest in Europe.

References


Abstract translations

Racisme culturel: corruption dans l’état du danemark?

Le racisme culturel a trouvé un terrain fertile dans l’Europe post-industrielle confrontée à la crise économique et désintégration sociale, mais ses manifestations varient d’un pays à l’autre. Le Dan-
El racismo cultural: algo corrompido en el estado de Dinamarca?

El racismo cultural se ha dado con un territorio fértil en una Europa posindustrial con una crisis económica y desintegración social. Sin embargo, la manifestación de este racismo varía según el país. Dinamarca, tradicionalmente considerado como un país liberal y tolerante, experimentó un cambio de actitud fundamental durante los primeros años de la década ochenta y ha salido siendo, potencialmente, uno de los países más racistas de Europa. Y paradójicamente, son los valores liberales que se utiliza para justificar las representaciones negativas de ‘otros’. Este papel examina las manifestaciones, en lugares específicas, del racismo cultural en Dinamarca que se puede identificar como anti-musulmanes y anti-refugiados. A través de entrevistas con mujeres de minorías [étnicas/religiosas], fragmentos de literatura de periódicos y materia difundida por organizaciones ultra-derechtistas el papel detalla la evolución de este discurso e indentifica como los principales protagonistas a: específicos grupos ultra-derechistas y anti-inmigración, los medios de comunicación y una tradición de investigación académica culturalmente determinística. La manifestación sútil del racismo cultural en Dinamarca, unida a una oposición y una legislación anti-racista inadecuadas hacían que este discurso resultara particularmente perjudicial y ‘legitimaron’ una variedad de políticas y prácticas racistas.

Palabras claves: ‘raza’, nación, racismo cultural, nacionalismo, Dinamarca.