

Self and space, resistance and discipline: a Foucauldian reading of George Orwell's *1984*

James A. Tyner

Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242-0001, USA

The novel 1984, George Orwell's nightmarish vision of totalitarianism published after the Second World War, remains relevant in the twenty-first century. Orwell's concerns regarding the abuse of power, the denial of self, and the eradication of both past and future continue to resonate in contemporary discussions of politics and society. Geographers, however, have directed minimal attention to the spatiality embedded within 1984. Accordingly, in this paper I examine the theoretical implications of space, resistance and discipline as manifest in the novel. Drawing on the theoretical insights of Michel Foucault, I detail how the spatial and temporal control of everyday activities serves to discipline spaces within a totalitarian society. Moreover, I suggest that 1984 illustrates how the production of knowledge through the act of writing may forge spaces of resistance within disciplined spaces. This paper contributes, therefore, in two areas, these being resistance geographies and fictive geographies.

Key words: resistance, discipline, George Orwell, literature.

Introduction

'To the future or to the past, to a time when thought is free...'
(Winston Smith in *1984*, Orwell 1983: 24)

Although written over a half-century ago, George Orwell's novel *1984* remains a significant political text. The title itself has become a political byword and innumerable terms from the text—such as *thought police*, *Big Brother* and *doublethink*—have entered our vocabulary (Deutscher 1971: 29). Meyers, furthermore, contends that the novel

succeeded brilliantly as a political fable, and continues to reverberate in our own time. It reveals

Orwell's acute historical sense, his imaginative sympathy with the millions of people persecuted and murdered in the name of absolutist ideologies. (2000: 288)

Accordingly, a substantial body of literature has emerged surrounding both the novel *1984* (Douglass 1985; Freedman 1984; Howe 1983; Hynes 1971; Jensen 1984; Sanderson 1988; Stansky 1983) and the author (Atkins 1954; Crick 1980; Meyers 2000). Geographers, however, have yet to appreciate fully the spatiality inherent in Orwell's fictive geographies.

Geographers have, though, provided extensive re-workings of spatiality. And it is within this project of reworking our geographical un-

derstandings that Soja (1996: 2) forwards a challenge to consider interesting new ways of thinking about space and social spatiality. Accordingly, in this paper I juxtapose the theoretical insights of Michel Foucault with Orwell's *1984*. My purpose, though, is neither to provide a Foucauldian reading of Orwell *per se*, nor an Orwellian legitimation of Foucault's theories. Rather, my intent is, through a merging of Orwell's fictive dis-utopia and Foucault's workings of power, to identify themes that speak to broader concepts of resistance, discipline and space. Thus, whereas Orwell's *1984* has been frequently—and correctly—read as a warning against totalitarian systems, I suggest that this text may be extended and also read to understand spaces of resistance and discipline.

Consequently, this paper draws on, and contributes to, two contemporary themes in geography, namely resistance geographies (Cresswell 2000; Jackson 1987) and fictive geographies (Brosseau 1994; Cresswell 1993; Sharp 2000; Silk 1984). Cresswell (2000: 259), for example, contends that resistance geographies are central to social and cultural geography. Thus, galvanized by the theoretical insights of Foucault, among others, many geographers have examined the nexus of space, power and social relations. As to the second theme, that of fictive geographies, I concur with Sharp who writes that:

Geographers undoubtedly have a contribution to make to the analysis of fiction. The 'imagined geographies' created through all sorts of media are central to the geographies used by people when going about their daily lives, so that it is important that such imaginings are understood by those of us trying to get to grips with contemporary geographical relationships and identities. (2000: 333)

Fictive geographies, such as Orwell's *1984*, also resonate well with Soja's conception of

Thirdspace. Whereas on the one hand, 'Thirdspace' refers to an interstitial position, a locus that blurs the distinction between binary thinking (e.g. discipline/resistance), on the other hand, 'Thirdspace' has another reading. As Soja explains, this conception is

a creative recombination and extension that builds on a Firstspace perspective that is focused on the 'real' material world and a Secondspace perspective that interprets this reality through 'imagined' representations of spatiality. A Thirdspace, therefore, is an investigation into a multiplicity of 'real-and-imagined places'. (1996: 6)

Consequently, the dis-utopia of Orwell's *1984*, modelled loosely on Stalin's Soviet Union, is just such a 'real-and-imagined' place, one that serves as an effective device to investigate concepts of spatiality theoretically.

A Foucauldian reading of Orwell, lastly, is appropriate in that questions of language and power comprise a key area of inquiry in the emergent sub-field of 'popular' geopolitics (cf. Sharp 1993, 1996). As Dodds (2000: 71–72) articulates, critical geopolitical authors have argued that ideas and representations about the political world are expressed and reproduced outside the narrow confines of the diplomatic circuit, foreign policy decision-making and intergovernmental conferences. To this end, the geopolitical representations of films, television shows, cartoons, music and postage stamps have been examined by geographers and other social scientists.

As a final caveat, though, a Foucauldian reading of fictive geographies is not without its problems. In particular, caution must be taken in forwarding interpretations of *1984* and of applying 'Orwellian' or 'Foucauldian' thoughts to other contexts and concepts. A perennial question surrounding *1984*, for example, a question that has continued to fuel the Orwell

industry ever since, is: What did Orwell intend the book to be? (Abrahams 1983: 3). Douglass, consequently, writes:

1984 has come to be a kind of cultural Rorschach. It has passed into our culture as a symbol and taken on a life of its own. All sorts of themes, many of them far removed from Orwell's original concerns, have been associated with it. It is a measure of the influence of the book that this is possible. (1985: 263)

The writings of Foucault, likewise, are open to multiple readings. Indeed, the growing assemblage of works of Foucault's life and work—bordering on the superfluous—is staggering (cf. Barker 1998; Brown 2000; Deleuze 1988; Hekman 1996; Macey 1994; McHoul and Grace 1993; McNay 1992; Sheridan 1980). As such, I take seriously Philo's admonition that

we ought to pause for a moment in our projects of combining Foucault with Giddens, Lefebvre, Mann, or whoever—the projects of turning Foucault into the 'same'—and instead we should recognise ... the 'otherness' of his perspective on geography. (2000: 208)

Apart from Philo's concern, Miller (2000: 19) notes also that Foucault left behind no synoptic critique of society, no system of ethics, no comprehensive theory of power, not even a generally useful historical method. Lastly, a Foucauldian reading is problematic in that Foucault himself would not approve of applying a 'Foucauldian' (or Orwellian, for that matter) approach to any subject. In response to a question on Marxism and geography, for example, Foucault explained that:

As far as I'm concerned, Marx doesn't exist. I mean, the sort of entity constructed around a proper name, signifying at once a certain individual, the totality of his writings, and an immense historical process

deriving from him ... It's always possible to make Marx into an author, localisable in terms of a unique discursive physiognomy, subjected to analysis in terms of originality or internal coherence. (1980: 76)

This is not to suggest, however, that Foucault would disapprove of applying his work to another subject, for as he explained later in the same interview:

If one or two of these 'gadgets' of approach or method that I've tried to employ ... can be of service to you, then I shall be delighted. If you find the need to transform my tools or use others then show me what they are, because it may be of benefit to me. (Foucault 1980: 65)

Orwell and 1984

In an essay on Charles Dickens (published originally in 1939), George Orwell¹ wrote: 'When one reads any strongly individual piece of writing, one has the impression of seeing a face somewhere behind the page ... What one sees is the face that the writer *ought* to have' (1981: 103–104). For this reason, I am concerned with the face of Orwell—the man behind the words—and how his positionality contributed to the fictive geographies of *1984*.

All texts are produced from somewhere and by someone; this means that it is impossible for anyone to escape their positionings (Sharp 2000). Orwell (1981: 311) himself explains in a 1946 essay that a writer's 'subject matter will be determined by the age he lives in ... but before he ever begins to write he will have acquired an emotional attitude from which he will never completely escape'. As such, the writings of Orwell are partly historical, partly autobiographical. His *Burmese Days* (1934), for example, drew on his experiences

working in Burma as a member of the Indian Imperial Police whereas his *Homage to Catalonia* (1938) detailed his time as a revolutionary fighter during the Spanish Civil War. *1984*, though, was written in the aftermath of the Second World War and the early years of the Cold War. Drawing on the recent wartime devastation of England and reports of cruelty, torture and purges of innocent civilians in Russia, Orwell incorporated contemporary events to create an atmosphere of documentary reality, and the power of the novel comes from a realistic use of familiar materials rather than from imaginary speculations about the future (Meyers 2000: 281). Equally important was that Orwell wrote *1984* as he was dying of tuberculosis. Meyers (2000: 278) explains that ‘Orwell’s awareness that death was approaching intensified his emotions and heightened his powers of expression’. Indeed, health problems plagued Orwell throughout his life, a fact that contributed to the tenor of his writing. Orwell, in fact, suffered from a chronic cough, numerous childhood bouts with bronchitis, and repeated cases of influenza and pneumonia. Moreover, while in Burma Orwell contracted dengue fever and while fighting in Spain he was shot through the neck by a sniper’s bullet.

Orwell was a socialist and this ideology permeates his writings. Orwell, in his essay *Why I Write* (1981 [1946]) suggests that there are ‘four great motives for writing’, and these include sheer egoism, esthetic enthusiasm, historical impulse and political purpose. This latter motive, Orwell (1981: 312–313) writes, is defined as a ‘desire to push the world in a certain direction, to alter other people’s idea of the kind of society that they should strive after’. Orwell then explains that, by nature, the first three motives would outweigh the fourth—at least in a peaceful age. Instead, he continues:

I spent five years in an unsuitable profession (the

Indian Imperial Police, in Burma), and then I underwent poverty and the sense of failure. This increased my natural hatred of authority and made me for the first time fully aware of the existence of the working classes, and the job in Burma had given me some understanding of the nature of imperialism: but these experiences were not enough to give me an accurate political orientation. Then came Hitler, the Spanish civil war... (1981: 313)

This political orientation of Orwell, rooted in his schooling at St Cyprian’s preparatory school and Eton College, was augmented through his sojourns in both Burma and Spain. He explained that ‘Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, *against* totalitarianism and *for* democratic socialism, as I understand it’ (1981: 314). Orwell continues: ‘I write ... because there is some lie that I want to expose, some fact to which I want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get a hearing’. Additionally, we may obtain a more clear understanding of the political intent of Orwell when we consider, again, his essay on Dickens. Orwell identifies two types of socially conscious writers, the ‘moralist’ and the ‘revolutionary’, and contends that Dickens was a moralist. Orwell writes:

Dickens’s criticism of society is almost exclusively moral. Hence the utter lack of any constructive suggestion anywhere in his work. He attacks the law, parliamentary government, the educational system ... without ever clearly suggesting what he would put in their places ... Dicken’s attitude is at bottom not even *destructive* ... It would be difficult to point anywhere in his books to a passage suggesting that the economic system is wrong *as a system* ... His whole ‘message’ is one that at first glance looks like an enormous platitude: If men would behave decently the world would be decent. (1981: 51–52; italics in original)

Conversely, Orwell argues that revolutionary writing provides a critique of the underlying systems—indeed, aims to turn upside down—the problems of society. Unfortunately, though, Orwell asserts that the ‘moralist and the revolutionary are constantly undermining each other’ (1981: 65) despite that the ‘two viewpoints are always tenable’ (1981: 64). From this examination of Dickens, a clarification of Orwell’s motive becomes apparent, namely to address ‘the central problem—how to prevent power from being abused’ (1981: 65).

Similarities in the writing process exist between Orwell and Foucault. As Foucault explained in 1983, a year before his death,

I believe that ... someone who is a writer is not simply doing his work in his books but that his major work is, in the end, himself in the process of writing his books. The private life on an individual ... and his works are interrelated ... because the work includes the whole life as well as the text. (quoted in Miller 2000: 19)

Interestingly, numerous biographers and other scholars contend that neither Orwell nor Foucault present explicitly positive, or constructive, blueprints for political action. Meyers (2000: 287), for example, writes that a fundamental problem is that in *1984* Orwell breaks the convention of both literary forms that shape the novel, realism and utopian romance, and deliberately disappoints the reader’s expectations. Likewise, McNay (1992) and others take Foucault to task for his gender blindness as well as his representation of power as ubiquitous. I suggest, though, that Orwell (and Foucault) does provide a constructive suggestion. Indeed, as Atkins (1954: 252) contends, Orwell ‘wished to rouse people to the dangers inherent in existing political tendencies. He did not believe that the individual was altogether powerless’. Consequently, a Foucauldian read-

ing of Orwell’s *1984* does provides insight into the juxtaposition of discipline and resistance.

A brief overview of 1984

1984 is set in Oceania, one of three fictionalized superpowers (the others being Eurasia and Eastasia). This tripartite division of the world, immediately recognizable to political geographers, is based on an ideologically determined balance of power, with each of the three superpowers maintaining similar totalitarian political structures and systems of social stratification (Craig 1983: 28). According to Deutscher (1971: 38), Orwell drew upon specific events of the Second World War, and especially the Yalta conference, in that Orwell was ‘convinced that Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt consciously plotted to divide the world, and to divide it for good, among themselves, and to subjugate it in common’. This is significant, in that Orwell is apparently making the argument that totalitarian in any form, irrespective of political orientation, is wrong.

The premise of the text is to present a dystopian world, one where the state is the ultimate source of power, and all forms of individuality and personality have become criminalized. Citizens live in an atmosphere of mistrust and extreme surveillance. Howe (1971: 44) contends, for example, that the text is ‘at once a model and a vision—a model of the totalitarian state in its “pure” or “essential” form and a vision of what this state can do to human life’.

Society is segmented into three classes: the Inner Party, which constitutes the elite upper class and numbers less than 2 per cent of the population; the Outer Party, composed of educated workers and represents about 15 per cent; and the Proles, or proletariat, who signify the working class. According to Strachey (1971:

57), in the novel the party has not yet achieved its objective of completely moulding human nature; members of the Outer Party, for example, are still subject to regrettable lapses, and a tense struggle by all means, from education, spying, torture and shooting, has to be waged to keep them in line.

Winston Smith, the main protagonist, lives in London, the chief city of Airstrip One (formerly England), which is one of the many provinces of Oceania. Winston is employed in the Records Department of the Ministry of Truth. In a not so subtle reference to Orwell's former employment as Talks Producer on the Eastern Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Winston's job is to rewrite history. During the Second World War, for example, Orwell was to produce news commentaries and cultural, educational and political programmes that would persuade intellectual Indians and other South-East Asians to support the British in the war effort (Crick 1980; Meyers 2000).

Winston is an ordinary civil servant. Abrahams (1983: 5), for example, suggests that Winston 'is a type of the colorless, minor civil servant who does what he is told to do—always'. This latter description in particular, I suggest, is overly simplistic and misses a key element in the resistance of Winston. Abrahams (1983: 5), for example, contends that when the novel begins, a bleak day in April, Winston 'commits his tiny, brave act of defiance—he starts to keep a diary, even though he knows that the punishment for doing so is death'. I disagree with this assertion and, as explained in a later section, I contend that Winston has repeatedly engaged in small acts of resistance. Whereas the decision to begin writing the diary is significant—particular as a plot device to begin a story—this constitutes one act of many that testify to the 'rebellious' character of Winston.

Winston is also read as an idealist. Watt identifies, for example, that for Winston, 'individual feeling is the most essential and desirable reality available' (1983: 108) and that Winston 'is even obsessed, in the typical humanist way, with unanswerable questions, and particularly the question of "Why?"' (Orwell 1983: 113). To remain human, to not be de-humanized, to not succumb to the tyranny of the state, is the primary motivation of Winston.

Critics have noted, though, that Winston is presented as a failed hero and a coward (cf. Meyers 2000: 287). Hence, Watt (1983: 112), while sympathetic to the character of Winston, contends that he 'is not a conscious nor a heroic protagonist of moral and intellectual convictions'. Winston's betrayals, his ultimate capitulation to 'Big Brother', and his becoming an alcoholic, for example, are used as evidence. And yet, I suggest, this constitutes a superficial reading of Winston and overlooks the broader message of Orwell, a point I raise later in the paper.

Apart from Winston, the novel revolves around O'Brien and Julia. O'Brien, a mysterious figure, is a member of the Inner Party. Winston believes—or at least hopes—that O'Brien is really a member of a secret revolutionary group known as the Brotherhood. This is supposedly an underground organization that exists to overthrow the Party. In actuality, though, O'Brien is not a traitor to the Party and, indeed, it is O'Brien who personally oversees the torture and confession of Winston. In contrast to the idealist Winston, O'Brien believes men are incapable of ruling themselves and are unworthy of free choice (Meyers 2000: 286).

Julia, like Winston, is employed in the Fiction Department in the Ministry of Truth. Her world-view, likewise in contrast to the idealism of Winston, is decidedly realistic and pragmatic. Craig (1983: 32), for example, suggests

that for Julia, 'the world around her is the only real one and, to explain what happens in it, there is no need to look for answers in regions that her eyes cannot see'. This ontological difference between Winston and Julia is important in terms of how they engage in acts of resistance—a point to be addressed later.

Although a member of the Junior Anti-Sex League, Julia also seeks out sexual relations with many Party members. Abrahams (1983: 5), accordingly, describes Julia as 'a secret rebel against the regime, expressing her rebellion through the illegal enjoyment of sex'. At first, this is unknown to Winston, who believes Julia to be either an agent of the Thought Police or, at the very least, an amateur spy. Julia, however, secretly passes a note to Winston that says simply '*I love you*'. Following this encounter they begin a secret love affair, an act which itself becomes an act of resistance.

Combined, the characters of Winston, O'Brien and Julia prefigure a discussion of humanity, individuality and social relations. Abrahams (1983: 4) contends, for example, that without these three characters the novel may have taken its place as an early polemic against totalitarianism and its consequences; however, with their presence in a plot that horrifies us even as it rivets our attention, in spite of or perhaps because of its affinities both to a thriller and to a love story, it has become one of the most widely read novels of our time. Indeed, it is through the association of these characters that Orwell's premise of resistance is manifest.

Two other characters, who ironically never 'appear' in the novel, figure prominently in the plot: 'Big Brother' and Emmanuel Goldstein. Orwell based these two characters on Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky, respectively. Big Brother is the leader of the Party. Goldstein, in contrast, is the enigmatic leader of the revolutionary Brotherhood. The literary association

between Big Brother/Stalin and Goldstein/Trotsky has, though, been well-documented. As detailed in the novel, the physical resemblance of the characters and their real-life models is explicit; moreover, even the name 'Goldstein' is a verbal echo of 'Bronstein', Trotsky's original surname (Freedman 1984: 609–610). For Winston, however, doubt remains as to whether Big Brother, Goldstein or the Brotherhood even exist (cf. Tucker 1983).

Throughout the novel, readers actually learn very little about Winston Smith or any of the other characters. Indeed, an oft-heard complaint—though by no means completely agreed upon—is that the character development is rudimentary and superficial; these critics, however, miss the point that in 1984 Orwell is trying to present the kind of world in which individuality has become obsolete and personality a crime (Howe 1971: 43). Moreover, as Howe rightly argues:

The whole idea of the self as something precious and inviolable is a *cultural* idea, and as we understand it, a product of the liberal era; but Orwell has imagined a world in which the self, whatever subterranean existence it manages to eke out, is no longer a significant value, not even a value to be violated. (1971: 43)

Rather than detracting from the novel, therefore, any perceived lack of character development is consistent with the thrust of the text, namely that the 'uniqueness' of people is stripped away under totalitarian systems.

Discipline and resistance in 1984

The imaginary world of 1984 is of a totalitarian society, modelled after the (real) fascist state of Mussolini's Italy, the nationalist-socialist state of Hitler's Germany and the Commu-

nist state of Stalin's Soviet Union. The form of social control, accordingly, is manifest more broadly in the control of thought and the destruction of memory, history and the debasement of language, and thus speaks to totalitarian systems in general. Allen, for example, contends that

such concerns become the inevitable preoccupation of totalitarian regimes, for as the theorists of the People's Republic of China have perceived, the political society cannot occupy the totality of human life so long as 'dangerous thoughts' in individuals persist. (1984: 152)

Significantly though, as Strub (1989: 41) identifies, there has been far more interest in Orwell's treatment of thought control—his inventions of Newspeak and doublethink, for example—and too little concern about the precise nature of the aversive context that permitted the cognitive manipulation to appear so effecting in controlling behaviour. In the following sections, therefore, I consider first, the material ways in which discipline was practised and, second, the spaces of resistance.

The discipline of self and space

A critical element within Foucault's writings, seen particularly in *Discipline and Punish*, is the concept of a 'political economy of the body' or, alternatively, a 'micro-physics'. Foucault, for example, explains that 'systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain "political economy" of the body ... it is always the body that is at issue—the body and its forces, their utility and docility, their distribution and their submission' (1979: 25). He goes on to argue that 'the body is ... directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it,

torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs' (1979: 25). Accordingly, discipline is meted on the body and this proceeds, initially, from the distribution of individuals in space (Foucault 1979: 141).

Within *1984*, it becomes clear that all aspects of life are regimented in Winston's world. The spatial and temporal elements of discipline, for example, are clearly illustrated in the everyday lives of party members:

In principle a Party member had no spare time, and was never alone except in bed. It was assumed that when he was not working, eating, or sleeping he would be taking part in some kind of communal recreations; to do anything that suggested a taste for solitude, even to go for a walk by yourself, was always slightly dangerous. There was a word for it in Newspeak: *ownlife*, it was called, meaning individualism and eccentricity. (Orwell 1983: 72)

As such, even walking home via an alternative route was enough to arouse suspicion; every behaviour, however inauspicious, was disciplined along state lines.

The spatial separation of daily life was augmented with respect to social relations. Within the dystopian world of Orwell's *1984*, for example, the corporeal 'cogs' of the Party were unaware of others' activities. They remained partitioned, each sequestered into their own enclosed spaces; and through their performance of specific functions, no member was able to see the totality of the system. By assigning each individual to a particular place, for example, party members are both socially and spatially separated from the state and society.

The enclosure and partitioning of bodies is insufficient, however, in disciplining space. As Foucault (1979: 170–171) identifies, 'the exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to

see induce effects of power'. He elaborates that 'the perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly' (Foucault 1979: 173). In 1984 it is the telescreen that is the major apparatus of surveillance and, hence, discipline. Early in the novel this apparatus is described:

The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. *There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.* (Orwell 1983: 2; italics added)

This last feature of the telescreen is significant, in that, as Strub (1989: 44) elaborates, despite the extensive surveillance and police resources of the state, arrests appear to occur capriciously, thereby generating some uncertainty about the completeness of surveillance at any specific place or time. Particularly noteworthy is the seemingly randomness of surveillance in Orwell's world and, consequently, the induced paranoia of *not* knowing when one is being watched. Accordingly, there existed an even greater uncertainty as to what constituted inappropriate behaviour. This property of surveillance thus augments Foucault's theorization of discipline, in that:

Disciplinary power ... is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. (1979: 187)

For Orwell, a totalitarian system predicated on surveillance served to maintain discipline. Consequent was a regimented, predictable, hyper-orderly society, one that negated human will, spontaneity and creativity. In short, discipline via corporeal control produced total conformity. A parallel is found with Foucault who argues that

Thanks to the techniques of surveillance, the 'physics' of power, the hold over the body, operate according to the laws of optics and mechanics, according to a whole play of spaces, lines, screens, beams, degrees and without recourse, in principle at least, to excess, force or violence. (1979: 177)

Again, as Winston (Orwell 1983: 2) explains of his life, 'You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized'. Aside from sounds, facial expressions were also disciplined. Winston explains:

It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place or within range of a telescreen. The smallest thing could give you away. A nervous tic, an unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself—anything that carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having to hide. In any case, to wear an improper expression on your face ... was itself a punishable offense. There was even a word for it in Newspeak: *facecrime*, it was called. (Orwell 1983: 55; italics in original).

Winston continues that 'To keep your face expressionless was not difficult, and even your breathing could be controlled, with an effort; but you could not control the beating of your heart, and the telescreen was quite delicate enough to pick it up' (Orwell 1983: 69–70). Even more insidious, however, is that the teles-

screen monitors not only sounds, physical movement and facial expressions, but also thoughts. When writing in his diary, for example, Winston explains that it does not matter whether he *writes* treasonous ideas, or merely thinks them:

Whether he wrote DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER, or whether he refrained from writing it, it made no difference ... The Thought Police would get him just the same. He had committed—would still have committed, even if he had never set pen to paper—the essential crime that contained all others in itself. Thoughtcrime, they called it. Thoughtcrime was not a thing that could be concealed forever. You might dodge successfully for a while, even for years, but sooner or later they were bound to get you. (Orwell 1983: 16–17)

Within the totalitarian world of Winston, therefore, all facets of humanity are monitored and disciplined. And yet this control of society and space is not performed equally. Rather, a hierarchy is evident. Foucault suggests that discipline is affected via ranking: ‘a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations’ (1979: 146). But as illustrated in *1984*, discipline also reinforces ranking dialectically. Consider, for example, the different lives of Winston, as an Outer Party member, and O’Brien, as an Inner Party member. Late in the novel Winston and Julia arrange to meet O’Brien at his apartment. In this scene O’Brien deliberately turns off his telescreen, much to the amazement of Winston and Julia. Winston exclaims ‘You can turn it off!’ to which O’Brien responds ‘Yes ... we [Inner Party members] have that privilege’ (Orwell 1983: 150). This brief encounter, both stylistically and theoretically, demonstrates a particular intersection of class,

space, privilege and discipline. Inequalities within spaces of discipline serve to mark individuals as privileged or not. The instrument of disciplinary control—the telescreen—is, simply put, classed. As a member of the Inner Party, O’Brien is largely immune to the disciplining aspects of the telescreen. Indeed, even the knowledge that *some* members of the Party were allowed to turn off the telescreen came as a revelation to Winston and Julia.

Within the spaces of *1984* surveillance produces a highly disciplined, ranked society. However, simply the act of being watched is insufficient. Indeed, as Strub (1989: 42) identifies, ‘the reason mere observation might induce coercive effects of power is that those being observed expect negative consequences to follow the detection of inappropriate behavior. These negative consequences are manifest in punishment, torture, and death’. Foucault, for example, asserts that public executions have juridico-political functions; that executions are ceremonies by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted (Foucault 1979: 48). He elaborates that:

The public execution ... deploys before all eyes an invincible force. Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. (1979: 48–49)

But this is not the case in *1984*. Rather, in Winston’s world torture is not for public spectacle; rather, it is largely hidden from sight.² As explained by Winston:

it was unusual for political offenders to be put on trial or even publically denounced. The great purges involving thousands of people, with public trials of traitors and thought-criminals who made abject confession of their crimes and were afterwards exe-

cuted, were special showpieces not occurring oftener than once in a couple of years. More commonly, people who had incurred the displeasure of the Party simply disappeared and were never heard from again. (Orwell 1983: 39)

Moreover, the arrests prior to punishment were also conducted in secrecy. Winston describes the process:

It was always at night ... The sudden jerk out of sleep, the rough hand shaking your shoulders, the lights glaring in your eyes ... In the vast majority of cases there was no trial, no report of the arrest. People simply disappeared, always during the night. Your name was removed from the registers, every record of everything you had ever done was wiped out, your one-time existence was denied and then forgotten. You were abolished, annihilated: *vaporized* was the usual word. (Orwell 1983: 17; italics in original).

In this totalitarian society, the *history* of people could be erased. Not simply death, but a social death so complete that all vestiges of an individual's life are removed. Accordingly, in the Orwellian world of 1984, the control of knowledge, of information—indeed of history itself—is paramount for the exercise of power and the disciplining of society. Winston, as an employee in the Records Department of the Ministry of Truth, is well-versed in this process. Indeed, it is Winston's job to (re)write history, to change 'facts' according to the demands of Big Brother. Moreover, Winston understands that 'Books ... were recalled and rewritten again and again, and were invariably reissued without any admission that any alteration had been made' (Orwell 1983: 35). What is most terrifying for Winston, though, is the complete control of the past: 'If the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or that event, *it never happened*—that, surely, was more ter-

rifying than mere torture and death' (Orwell 1983: 30).

It is within the production and reproduction of truth, therefore, that the *power* of the Party and State is manifest. But how is power to be conceived? For Foucault, power is intimately associated with the production of knowledge. As clearly articulated in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1979: 27) asserts that power produces knowledge; that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. Moreover, Foucault (1990: 94–95) forwards a number of propositions on power, of which I highlight three. First, he suggests that power is not something that is acquired, seized or shared. As such, power is not something that can be possessed by any particular individual or group; power, rather, is a social relation. As Deleuze (1988: 71) explains, power 'passes through the hands of the mastered no less than through the hands of the masters'. Power, thus, is best conceptualized as a force, or a flow. Miller, for example, poetically describes Foucault's concept of force

not as a fixed quantity of physical force, but rather as a stream of energy flowing through every living organism and every human society, its formless flux harnessed in various patterns of behavior, habits of introspection, and systems of knowledge, in addition to different types of political, social, and military organization. (2000: 15)

A second Foucauldian proposition is that relations of power are not in a position of exteriority *vis-à-vis* other types of relationships (e.g. knowledge, economic, sexual, spatial). Third, Foucault's (1990: 94) concept of power challenges a traditional binary system of discipline and resistance, proposing that there is no bi-

nary opposition between powerful and powerless—a point to which I return later in this paper.

A dominant theme of *1984*, certainly, is the critical control of discourse, of truth, and of knowledge: techniques of power are employed to maintain a totalitarian system. This resonates well—or at least it does so initially—with a Foucauldian understanding of power/knowledge. In their reading of Foucault, for example, McHoul and Grace (1993: 70–71) explain that knowledge gained on the basis of disciplinary power is formulated according to ‘norms’ of behaviour. Hence, *thoughtcrimes*, *facecrimes* and *ownlives* were rigidly policed and enforced.

Significantly, Winston himself provides a Foucauldian reaction to the State. As Deleuze (1988: 71) writes with respect to Foucault’s concept of power, ‘We should not ask: “What is power and where does it come from?” but “How is it practised?”’ In the novel, though, Winston does claim to have identified the ‘how’ of power. Unlike Foucault, though, Winston was not satisfied with simply identifying the techniques of discipline, but instead questioned the ‘why’ of discipline. As explained in the novel:

The past not only changed, but changed continuously. What most afflicted [Winston] with the sense of nightmare was that he had never clearly understood *why* the huge posture was undertaken. The immediate advantages of falsifying the past were obvious, but the ultimate motive was mysterious. He took up his pen again and wrote: *I understand HOW: I do not understand WHY.* (Orwell 1983: 70; italics in original)

This simple question reappears towards the end of the novel. During the interrogation scene towards the end of the book O’Brien asks Winston if he remembers writing the above

question in his diary. He then asks Winston: ‘You understand well enough *how* the Party maintains itself in power. Now tell me *why* we cling to power. What is our motive? Why should we want power?’ (Orwell 1983: 233).

Winston responds by saying that the Party believes humans are incapable of self-rule and, adopting a Hobbesian view, suggests that the Party and State exist for the good of the majority. To this answer, however, Winston is punished by O’Brien. The Inner Party member explains:

I will tell you the answer to my question ... The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness; only power, pure power ... We know that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is power. (Orwell 1983: 234–235)

The statement that ‘the object of power is power’ is clearly discordant with Foucault’s conception of power. For Foucault, power is not something to be possessed but instead to be exercised. O’Brien, conversely, argues that ‘power is not a means; it is an end’ (Orwell 1983: 235). Also, unlike the class-based disciplined spaces of *1984*, Foucault’s (1979: 26) theorization of power contends that power ‘is not the “privilege”, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class’. The Orwellian conception of power, lastly, differs in another respect: the production of disciplined bodies, according to Foucault, often serves a material gain:

it is largely as a force of production that the body is

invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection...; the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. (Foucault 1979: 26)

Yet in the totalitarian world of Orwell's 1984, power is—apparently—neither universal nor exercised as a productive system. Power *becomes* the State; the State *is* power. O'Brien explains that 'power is collective' and that

every human being is doomed to die, which is the greatest of all failures. But if he can make complete, utter submission, if he can escape from his identity, if he can merge himself in the Party so that he *is* the Party, then he is all-powerful and immortal. (Orwell 1983: 235–236)

It is thus through the power/knowledge nexus that all semblances of humanity are eradicated, leaving—ostensibly—nothing but the State. O'Brien continues, 'Never again will you be capable of love, or friendship, or joy of living, or laughter, or curiosity, or courage, or integrity. You will be hollow. We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves' (Orwell 1983: 228–229).

In the novel 1984, therefore, Orwell envisions a totalitarian state in which complete discipline proceeds from the power/knowledge nexus as manifest in the control of thought. O'Brien explains

We are not content with negative obedience, nor even with the most abject submission ... We do not destroy the heretic because he resists us; so long as he resists us we never destroy him ... We make him one of ourselves before we kill him ... Even the victim of the Russian purges could carry rebellion locked up in his skull as he walked down the passage waiting for the bullet. (Orwell 1983: 337)

Here Orwell draws explicitly on his understanding of Stalin's Soviet Union, and envisions a state so disciplined that not even erroneous thoughts at the moment of execution could be tolerated.

In short, Orwell warns his readers that power, rather than simply techniques of power, *can* be possessed and transformed by a minority faction and in such as society there is no self devoid of the State. This is not a condemnation of socialism *per se*, for Orwell was a dedicated socialist; rather, Orwell developed a hyper-repressive society that exists irrespective of political orientation, a society predicated on control for control's sake. Neither Winston nor the reader is given anything more rational than this—the irrational side of totalitarianism and the eradication of humanity in the name of the State (see also Freedman 1984: 613).

Self-resistance and revolution

If, in a society as that imagined by Orwell, power is ultimately possessed, is resistance possible? Was Orwell, for example, able to fictionalized a society so totalitarian that no spaces of resistance could be found? It is commonly understood that, for example, that Winston is destroyed and defeated, and that the State is indeed all-encompassing. Meyers, for example, writes:

Although a faint flicker of Orwellian humor survives in the last chapter ... the end of the novel is totally bleak. Winston, neither rescued nor rewarded, is reduced to infantilism, cowardice and self-pitying alcoholism. His enlightenment about the meaning of his life—that he is merely subject to a monstrous lust for power—coincides with *the extinction of all hope*. (2000: 287, emphasis added)

And it is because of Winston's defeat that

Orwell's *1984* is read as a negative account of resistance towards disciplined states. But is this accurate? Does Orwell, as a self-proclaimed revolutionary writer (as opposed to the moralist Dickens) offer the reader a constructive suggestion?

Discipline, in the Orwellian world of *1984*, served to subsume individuality within the domain of the State. Winston explains:

The terrible thing that the Party had done was to persuade you that mere impulses, mere feelings, were of no account, while at the same time robbing you of all power over the material world. When once you were in the grip of the Party, what you felt or did not feel, what you did or refrained from doing, made literally no difference ... What mattered were individual relationships, and a completely helpless gesture, an embrace, a tear, a spoken word to a dying man, could have value in itself. (Orwell 1983: 146)

Does Orwell, though, provide a space for resistance in *1984* and, by implication, in a totalitarian society? And if so, where is this space located? A Foucauldian perspective would assuredly provide such a space. Foucault, as indicated earlier, attempted to de-stabilize the notion of an oppositional division of discipline/resistance or powerful/powerless. Alternately, Foucault (1994: 354) argued that 'aside from torture and execution which preclude any resistance, no matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groups'. This is so because 'where there is power, there is resistance; and this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' (Foucault 1990: 95).

For Winston, we read that resistance was not to 'acquire' power, but instead to retain a semblance of humanity, of individuality. This does, in fact, conform with Foucault's prop-

osition that power is not something to be possessed or acquired, but rather is a force to affect others. As Deleuze (1988: 71) identifies, an exercise of power shows up as an affect; to incite, provoke and produce constitute active affects, while to be incited or provoked, to be induced to produce constitute reactive affects. Accordingly, resistance is most effective when it is directed at a 'technique' of power rather than at 'power' in general; resistance, in short, consists of countering these techniques.

In the novel Winston discovers that it is the proletariat who have not lost sight of their humanity or individuality. The proles, Winston concludes, had stayed human. Resistance, therefore, is manifest as a means to stay human within a de-humanizing environment. Consequently, the actions of Winston are directed firstly towards a personal liberation rather than a complete revolution. Only later, as both Party members and the proles develop a consciousness, may the entire system be overturned.

Winston recognizes, however, that overt resistance is neither practical nor desirable. As explained early in the novel, the disciplinary control of the Party was near complete:

Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed—no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimeters inside your skull. (Orwell 1983: 24)

And yet, spaces of resistance were to be found, minuscule perhaps, but spaces nonetheless and located in the minutia of the everyday. Consequently, when we re-consider the disciplining functions of the telescreen, we find—however, small and fleeting—instances of resistance: [Winston] 'kept his back turned to the telescreen. It was safer; though, as he well knew, even a back can be revealing' (Orwell 1983: 3).

Other times, while facing the telescreen, Winston would deliberately affect his appearance: 'He had set his features into the expression of quiet optimism which it was advisable to wear when facing the telescreen' (Orwell 1983: 4). The ability to oppose the surveillance of the telescreen was also facilitated by the physical location of Winston *vis-à-vis* the physical layout of his apartment:

By sitting in the alcove, and keeping well back, Winston was able to remain outside the range of the telescreen, so far as sight went. He could be heard, of course, but so long as he stayed in his present position he could not be seen. It was partly the unusual geography of the room. (Orwell 1983: 5)

Thus, operating within the interstices of the disciplined space, Winston discovers, and exploits, a design flaw in his apartment. These are definitive examples of momentary transgressions. Winston understands that to sit, for example, with his back to the screen for a longer period of time would raise suspicion. Accordingly, he adjusts, spatially and temporally, his behaviour and physical persona to challenge the apparent omnipotence of the Party through the use of telescreens.

Julia's resistance is decidedly different from Winston's in that hers is more practical, more physical, a resistance based on sexuality.³ In the novel it is explained that 'Life as she saw it was quite simple. You wanted a good time; "they", meaning the Party, wanted to stop you having it; you broke the rules as best you could'. Winston, of course, recognizes the political implications of her sexuality. When Winston discovers that Julia has engaged in scores of sexual affairs with other Party members, for example, his heart leaps. He wishes that 'it had been hundreds—thousands' of times; for Winston, 'anything that hinted at corruption always filled him with a wild hope' (Orwell 1983:

111). He explains to Julia: 'The more men you've had, the more I love you ... I hate purity, I hate goodness. I don't want any virtue to exist anywhere' (Orwell 1983: 111). Tellingly, after they have sex, Winston reflects that 'Their embrace had been a battle, the climax a victory. It was a blow struck against the Party. It was a political act' (Orwell 1983: 112).

Certainly her sexual relations may be—and have been—read as a form of resistance, but so too are her other everyday activities. On their first meeting, for example, Julia explains to Winston that her activities with the Junior Anti-Sex League, her being a troop leader for the Spies, are all part of an elaborate disguise. She explains to Winston:

I'm good at games ... I always carry one end of a banner in the processions. I always look cheerful and I never shirk anything. Always yell with the crowd, that's what I say. It's the only way to be safe. (Orwell 1983: 108)

The goal for Julia, unlike Winston, is to circumvent the rules rather than challenging them (Meyers 2000: 284). Julia thus seeks to work within the system, rather than overthrowing the Party. Prior to meeting Winston, she had never heard of the Brotherhood and afterwards refused to believe in its existence. For Julia, 'Any kind of organized revolt against the Party, which was bound to be a failure, struck her as stupid. The clever thing was to break the rules and stay alive all the same' (Orwell 1983: 116). Indeed, even though Julia 'hated the Party, and said so in the crudest words', she 'made no general criticism of it' (Orwell 1983: 116). And yet Julia's 'breaking of the rules' did constitute a serious act of resistance in that her transgressions constituted an individuality that was the antithesis of the Party doctrine. In this way, her physical resistance (as manifest in sexual inter-

course) was perhaps more egregious to the Party than many of Winston's activities.

The love affair between Winston and Julia is also significant in that the sexual act is tactical. Winston, indeed, explains early in the novel that the 'sexual act, successfully performed, was rebellion' (Orwell 1983: 60). This works, given that within Oceania, sexuality is (supposedly) rigidly controlled. Marriages between Party members are to be approved by a committee; permission to marry was refused if the coupled concerned gave the impression of being physically attracted to one another (Orwell 1983: 58). The purpose of marriage was neither communal nor based on love; rather, the only recognized purpose of marriage was to beget children—future agents of surveillance—for the service of the Party; as such, sexuality was to be restricted to biological reproduction (Orwell 1983: 58). As O'Brien explains towards the end of the novel:

in the future there will be no wives and no friends. Children will be taken from their mothers at birth, as one takes eggs from a hen. The sex instinct will be eradicated. Procreation will be an annual formality like the renewal of a ration card. We shall abolish the orgasm. Our neurologists are at work upon it now. There will be no loyalty, except loyalty toward the Party. (Orwell 1983: 238)

The eugenical undertones of the Party's programme of de-sexualization are readily apparent. In its efforts to de-sexualize society, organizations such as the Junior Anti-Sex League (which advocates complete celibacy and contends that reproduction should be solely via artificial insemination, and of which Julia was a member) are formed. Furthermore, the appearance of the members of the Junior Anti-Sex League—an idealized type of tall muscular youths and deep-bosomed maidens, blond-haired, vital, sunburnt, carefree—is an obvious

swipe at the prurience of the Nazis (Robinson 1983: 150).

The Party, Julia, Winston, O'Brien: all agree that power, discipline and totalitarianism is connected to normal, everyday activities, such as walking, thinking, speaking and engaging in sexual relations. However, the most significant act of resistance contained in *1984*, I argue, is found within the discussion of Winston's diary. Certainly, the simple act of purchasing and possession of a diary constitutes a punishable offence and thus may be read as an act of resistance. However, the diary—written within the spaces of a novel—hint at a deeper meaning of resistance to totalitarian systems. At the outset of the novel, for example, Orwell writes:

For whom, it suddenly occurred to [Winston] to wonder, was he writing this diary? For the future, for the unborn ... For the first time the magnitude of what he had undertaken came home to him. How could you communicate with the future? (1983: 6)

Later Orwell describes Winston as 'a lonely ghost uttering a truth that nobody would ever hear' (1983: 24). Orwell continues:

But so long as [Winston] uttered it, in some obscure way the continuity was not broken. It was not by making yourself heard but by staying sane that you carried on the human heritage. He went back to the table, dipped his pen, and wrote: *To the future or to the past, to a time when thought is free ... greetings!* (1983: 24; italics in original)

Immediately after writing these words in his diary Winston reflects that he is already dead and, more significant: 'Now that he had recognized himself as a dead man it became important to stay alive as long as possible' (Orwell 1983: 25). Winston, I contend, embodies Orwell. Clearly, as his biographers have identified, Orwell's fiction was decidedly auto-

biographical (cf. Crick 1980; Meyers 2000). Orwell *knew* he was dying, just as Winston understood that his days also were numbered.⁴ Accordingly, it was imperative for Winston to stay alive as long as possible—to finish his warning to the future—just as Orwell was working feverishly to finish *1984* as his warning against State repression.

A constructive suggestion is evident; Orwell does not disappoint his readers, for *our* reading of the novel, *our* engagement with the dystopia of Oceania, and *our* understanding of the workings of the Party is itself an act of resistance towards future disciplinary procedures. If one accepts that Winston is Orwell, then Winston does succeed because his message remains. It is through this merging of Orwell/Winston that the true message, the final act of resistance, is revealed. Even if Winston did not succeed, others would, and so we see not Winston's diary remaining, but rather Orwell's narrative of Winston. And thus, Winston—through Orwell—successfully resists; his warning does remain, to be read by countless generations even after his (Winston's/Orwell's) death. Consequently, we come to embody Winston/Orwell and the readership of *1984* becomes the Brotherhood. In the end, it is the desire to push the world in a certain direction, to alter people's idea of the kind of society that they should inhabit, that is, after all, why Orwell (and Winston) wrote.

Conclusion

Sharp (2000: 332) cautions that 'Some texts may present revolutionary worldviews, but unless they are widely read, their influence on popular imaginations will be slight'. George Orwell's *1984* presented a radical and revolutionary world-view, one that clearly is widely read; more than ten million copies have been

purchased. Terms such as '*Big Brother* and *Thought Police* permeate our conversations, and the overall content of the novel continues to influence our outlook on both politics in general and state control in particular. Furthermore, Tucker (1983: 93) asserts that Orwell, though no theoretician, was nevertheless a significant contributor to thinking about totalitarianism. He concludes that by producing a work of creative literature rather than a theoretical tract, Orwell achieved something that none of the theoreticians did: he made his imagined world real for us, whereas very much of the scholarly literature made the real seem remote (Tucker 1983: 93–94).

In this paper I have provided a Foucauldian reading of *1984*. Accordingly, I suggest that Orwell's novel speaks to broader concepts of self and space, resistance and discipline, rather than simply totalitarian systems. Colin Gordon (1994: xv), in his introduction to a collection of Foucault's essays on power, writes that Foucault's main point was not about the nature of communist power but, rather, about the presence in modern history of a repertoire of techniques of power which do not bear the distinctive emblem of the regime—socialist, communist, fascist—that uses them. Orwell, likewise, was less concerned about the political orientation of abuses of power as he was about the manifestation of power and the loss of humanity, of individuality. To this end Orwell envisioned a totalitarian state so disciplined—spatially, temporally and socially—that all vestiges of humanity and individuality were to be subsumed under the control of the state. Consequently, Orwell suggests that the production and manipulation of knowledge are critical to the usurpation of power.

And yet, as Foucault (Faubion 1994: 453) would later identify, 'the rules that exist to limit power can never be stringent enough'. Resistance may always be found within the

interstices of disciplined spaces. Caution must be taken, however. As Cresswell (2000: 259) identifies, ‘there is a danger that no area of social life will not be described as resistance’. More problematic is that ‘The romance of resistance leads to a curious kind of inertia in which an apparently unitary, dominating power is seen to be challenged everywhere and thus by a curious magic remains unchallenged’ (Cresswell 2000: 259). Orwell himself warned his readers against this misidentification of resistance. Winston’s mistaken assumption that O’Brien, for example, was a revolutionary contributed to Winston’s own downfall. Nevertheless, acts of resistance are found in *1984*, ranging from a manipulation of the physical layout of rooms, to small facial expressions or other bodily gestures. Sexuality, also, serves as a political act. Significant also is that the juxtaposition of resistance as exhibited by Winston and Julia serves as a reminder against essentializing discussions of power, discipline and resistance. Most important, however, is that Winston, through his writing, understood that he would be killed. And Orwell understood that, while writing the novel, he was likewise dying. This parallel, this transposition of Orwell/Winston, offers the strongest clue as to the manifestation of resistance within *1984*, namely that the *act of writing*—a production of knowledge—for Orwell/Winston was itself a form of resistance.

Consequently, at the end of the novel, we see not Winston sitting in The Chestnut Tree café, but rather Orwell himself. Tellingly, the power/knowledge of which Foucault writes so eloquently may be applied to either/and processes of discipline/resistance.

Notes

1 George Orwell is the pen name of Eric Arthur Blair.

The son of a minor British official, Orwell was born in 1903 in Motihari, Bengal, India. Much of his early childhood, however, was spent in England with his mother (his father stayed in South Asia till 1912). As a child, he attended St Cyprian’s preparatory school and, later, Eton College. Throughout his life Orwell worked in an assortment of jobs, most related to journalism and literature. His first work, though, was as an Assistant Superintendent of Police in Burma from 1922 to 1928. Later, he taught at a small private school in Middlesex; fought in the Spanish Civil War; worked for the BBC disseminating propaganda to British Colonies in India and South-East Asia; and as literary editor for *The Tribune*. He died of tuberculosis in 1950.

- 2 Minor references to public executions are in evidence in *1984*, an observation that seemingly contradicts Winston’s statement that public purges are unusual. We are left with two possible explanations for these seemingly contradictory statements. First, biographers have noted that Orwell, given his declining health, was not able to re-read his novel and correct certain inconsistencies. These statements, therefore, may simply be read as errors made by Orwell in his writing. A second interpretation, however, is that, while unusual, Winston does not say that *all* executions were conducted in private. It may be that certain criminals—particularly prisoners of war—were more likely to be publically executed, whereas prisoners of the state were simply made to ‘vanish’.
- 3 Not all critics are in agreement that Julia’s sexuality is a form of resistance. Strachey (1971), for example, contends that Julia is no romantic revolutionary nor intellectual; rather, she ‘just wants some hearty sex, normally mingled with tender emotion.’ Strachey, though, misses the argument that within Oceania sex is a punishable offence. I am indebted to one reviewer who, in *newspeak*, comments that “‘just want[ing] some hearty sex, normally mingled with tender emotions’ in *Airstrip One* is revolutionary praxis of double-plus-unnormal crimethink’.
- 4 Scholars have also noted that the tortures Winston would endure in the novel mirror the medical treatments Orwell endured during his hospital stays. During the interrogation scene, for example, O’Brien says to Winston: ‘You are the last man ... You are the guardian of the human spirit. You shall see yourself as you are’ (Orwell 1983: 241). At that moment, Winston is ordered to undress and look upon his body in the mirror: ‘Winston undid the bit of string that held his overalls together ... [On looking at his body], its actual appear-

ance was frightening, and not merely the fact that he knew it to be himself ... The creature's face seemed to be protruded, because of its bent carriage. A forlorn, jailbird's face with a nobby forehead running back into a bald scalp, a crooked nose and battered-looking cheekbones above which the eyes were fierce and watchful. The cheeks were seamed, the mouth had a drawn-in look ... He had gone partially bald ... Except for his hands and a circle of his face, his body was gray all over with ancient, ingrained dirt. Here and there under the dirt there were the red scars of wounds, and near the ankle the varicose ulcer was an inflamed mass with flakes of skin peeling off. But the truly frightening thing was the emaciation of his body. The barrel of the ribs was as narrow as that of a skeleton; the legs had shrunk so that the knees were thicker than the thighs ... The curvature of the spine was astonishing. The thin shoulders were hunched forward so as to make a cavity of the chest, the scraggy neck seemed to be bending double under the weight of the skull' (Orwell 1983: 241–242). In this passage, Orwell is apparently describing himself via the character of Winston. As one reviewer commented, however, we may not want to accept this comparison between Orwell and Winston too easily.

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Abstract translations

Le soi et l'espace, la résistance et la discipline: une lecture foucaultienne du roman 1984 de George Orwell

Publié au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le roman *1984*, dans lequel George Orwell dépeint sa vision cauchemardesque du totalitarisme, semble toujours pertinent au vingt-et-unième siècle. Les préoccupations qui troublaient cet auteur à propos de l'abus de pouvoir, l'abnégation et l'éradication autant du passé que de l'avenir sont toujours d'actualité dans les échanges d'opinions en ce qui concerne les politiques et la société. Les géographes ont toutefois été peu enclin à étudier la spatialité présente dans le roman *1984*. Par conséquent, j'examine dans cet article les conséquences théoriques pour ce qui est de l'espace, de la résistance et de la discipline qui sont exposés dans le roman. En s'inspirant des réflexions théoriques de Michel Foucault, je me penche plus en particulier sur la maîtrise de l'espace et du temps dans la vie quotidienne au sein d'une société totalitaire qui sert à former des espaces rigidelement assujettis à la discipline. De plus, je cherche à montrer que le roman *1984* illustre une forme d'écriture qui produit un savoir permettant de construire des espaces de résistance à l'intérieur même de ces espaces assujettis. Cet article contribue donc à deux domaines de connaissances, à savoir, les géographies de la résistance et les géographies de l'imaginaire.

Mots-clefs: résistance, discipline, George Orwell, littérature.

El yo y el espacio, resistencia y disciplina: una interpretación Foucaultiana de 1984 de George Orwell

La novela *1984*, la visión pesadillesca de George Orwell de totalitarismo publicada después de la segunda guerra mundial, todavía tiene validez en el

siglo 21. Orwell se preocupa por el abuso de poder, la negación del individuo, y la eliminación del pasado y el futuro y éstos siguen siendo los temas de debates sobre la política y la sociedad. Sin embargo, los geógrafos no han prestado mucha atención a las cuestiones de espacio en la novela 1984. Por consiguiente aquí examinamos las implicaciones teóricas de espacio, resistencia y disciplina, así como se manifiestan en la novela. Hacemos uso de las ideas teóricas de Michel Foucault para explicar como el

control espacial y temporal de actividades cotidianas ayuda a disciplinar espacios dentro de una sociedad totalitaria. Además, sugiero que 1984 demuestra como la producción de conocimiento por el acto de escribir puede crear espacios de resistencia dentro de espacios disciplinados. Por lo tanto, este papel contribuye a las geografías de resistencia y ficticia.

Palabras claves: resistencia, disciplina, George Orwell, literatura.

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