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MUSIC, SPACE, IDENTITY: GEOGRAPHIES OF YOUTH CULTURE IN BANGALORE

Abstract

This article begins from a perceived lack of empirical evidence in cultural studies, namely the ethnography of cultural globalization in ‘global cities’ other than those of the West. Youth culture among the upper strata of the South-Indian metropolis Bangalore is taken as an instance of how modernity is experienced and produced in the post-colonial Third World. The focus lies on the reception of Western pop music, but music is treated broadly as a practice situated in, and producing, real and imagined space. Two examples of these musical practices serve to elaborate on Indian power relations, Indian modernity and the critical geography of music.

Keywords

globalization; youth culture; music; urban geography; cultural identity; India

Globalization in the Third World

It has been said that the Indian personality isn’t well integrated, and that, unlike the Western, it fails to make a coherent synthesis of different elements in its experience. It must be remembered that the elements the Indian is expected to synthesize are more various and further apart from one another than any within the national experience of any contemporary Westerner . . . . But the Indian’s proverbial way of dealing with contradictions he can’t reconcile is to isolate them from one another and to pretend
that one has nothing to do with the other. . . . Metaphorically speaking, the head is separated from the heart, the limbs from the body, and sex from the soul.

(Jussawalla, 1974: 33)

GLOBALIZATION IS ABOUT the formations of spaces in which economies, technologies, policies, things and bodies from different places intermingle. It’s odd that in empirical study, this perspective has mostly been applied to globalizing spaces in the West. Odd, because it was, after all, the world outside Europe that first had to deal with the hybridizations and disruptions the literature of globalization talks about (e.g. Hannerz, 1990; Hall, 1992; Appadurai, 1997). Through the mechanisms of colonialism, Third World cities were ‘postmodern’ and ‘multicultural’ long before migrations to the First World brought forth similar cultural differences there. People in the Third World got used to reflexively comparing and combining differing cultures – they were forced to – long before Westerners began taking interest in yoga and salsa. Obviously, the unequal relations between colonizer and colonized benefited and still benefit the hegemony of the colonizer’s culture. When the colonizers left, they left not only a yearning for further westernization amongst certain Third World urban élites, but also the complex reactions against this in the form of new nationalisms and renewed regionalisms (Nandy, 1983).

As Anthony King (1995) argues, ‘nation-state’, ‘modernity’, ‘postmodernity’ and ‘globalization’ are not simply Western export products. The world is made as much by ‘us’ as by ‘them’, politico-economically as well as psychoculturally. Why is it then that, for all the speaking of ‘listening to the Third World speak back’, the way ‘they’ have related to ‘us’ has received so little attention? There has been a lot of speculation about the impact of Western cultures on poorer countries (e.g. Schiller, 1976). We know, by now, that we have to answer the simplism of the cultural imperialism thesis and romantic images of the ‘noble savage’ with the Foucauldian question ‘who speaks?’ (Tomlinson, 1991). Then why don’t we find out how the West is actually experienced in postcolonial situations? And note that postcoloniality is more than ‘the rest’ coming to ‘the West’, it’s also ‘the West’ still going to ‘the rest’ (cf. Hall, 1992). Where, asks James Carrier (1995) in response to Edward Said (1978), is the theory and interpretation of occidentalism?

In this article, I want to explore interpretatively some of the ways rich youth in metropolitan India construct the sort of real and imaginary geographies that have been largely left out of the literature on globalization. I will focus on their practices of ‘going out’. Why youth? Because they are the ones most involved in translating tradition, and translating tradition in the Third World means coming to terms with the presence of the West. Why rich? Because to engage fully with this presence, you have to have money. Why Bangalore? Because India’s complicated history and painful nation-building makes her exemplary in many ways,
Bangalore arguably being the city where the struggle for the definition of the future is most felt. Why going out? Because, again oddly, study of youth culture has explained youth identity more in terms of demographics and textuality, while going out is, I think, for many young people, in Bangalore as in London, the practice around which their politics, pleasures and spatialities are organized – especially through music (Grossberg, 1997; Ingham et al., 1999). And why ethnographically? Because only by looking at the practices of those involved in the construction of global scapes, can we appreciate the concrete basis of these abstract processes.² I shall use the following participant observations for some reflections on the politics of globalization.

Music in a global city

The public sphere of India is a striking illustration of what the colonial confrontation between Europe and Asia led to politically. The Republic of India has always been fuelled by hybrid discourses of social solidarity and multiculturalism, initially developed by intellectuals such as Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru. These discourses – Leninism, industrialism, nationalism, regionalism, separatism, fundamentalism, spiritualism, authoritarianism, feminism, populism, élitism, environmentalism – existed uncomfortably amongst each other, resulting in an interesting mishmash in policy, media and social psychology. Recently however, as elsewhere in Asia, it has been the discourse of neoliberalism that has attained a hegemonic position. The Indian ‘New Economic Policy’ was implemented through the five-year-plan (1992–1997) and encouraged privatization and liberalization of external markets. Most of the NEP shows the good old optimism that sociologists of development ascribe to the so-called modernization theory (Tomlinson, 1991: 143–4; for a discussion of NEP see Sinha, 1994).

Those urbanites of India that can indulge in the new freedom of choice hail the coming of multinationals – of any multinational: Pepsi, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Sony, Ford, Cosmopolitan, Orange. Bangalore particularly has an entrepreneurial feel to it, with its colleges, software industries, fast-growing population (c. 6 million) and prestigious commercial and residential building projects (see IBI, 1994). The city has always had an image of openness and progress; while it was called the ‘Garden City’ because of its green boulevards and parks, now it is computers and pubs that are associated with the ‘Silicon Valley of India’. International events such as the Miss World contest in 1996 affirmed Bangalore’s place on the map of international business and investment.

The supply in the music stores of Bangalore has not been altered much by the NEP. Because the music market is not yet open for foreign record companies, a few big Indian licence companies still decide what comes on cassettes and what does not. The CDs that music stores semi-legally redistribute from foreign labels are a niche market for the upper classes. The selection policy of licence
companies and music stores has always been an Indian interpretation of what ‘Western popular music’ is supposed to include. You can buy most UK/USA hit albums in India, but classics such as Lou Reed or Tom Waits are very hard to find. Of ‘alternative’ Western popular music, it is only hard rock, heavy metal and some grunge that is available – no Police, no Pixies. Of course, the arbitrariness of this musical gatekeeping is only frustrating for those who can take the supply in the West as the norm.³

But the 1990s brought change. The musical landscape of India has been transformed drastically by the coming, in 1991, of Rupert Murdoch’s StarTV, the 24-hour-satellite network of Asia. StarTV exemplifies, in the audio-visual domain, the sudden keenness with which multinationals turn to Asia’s gigantic middle- to upper-class consumer markets. MTV Asia was in the original Indian Star package, but moved over to the broadcasting system of state-owned Doordarshan in 1994. Star reacted with StarMusic, later Channel [V] (Ninan, 1995: 172–4). MTV Asia (now de facto MTV India) and Channel [V] brought the flashiness of youth culture into Indian homes. Young people acquired a new cosmopolitan literacy in the syntax of the music video, along with advertising, fashion, film, dance. Not only was there more music at hand; the Western pop stars had now become visible.⁴

The distribution of Western pop music has further been enhanced by the mushrooming of pubs in Bangalore. The poshness, the non-Indianess, of pub space is invariably accentuated with Western pop music and TV sets playing MTV or Channel [V]. The dance clubs of mid-1990s Bangalore – Concorde and The Club – and malls and shops aiming at a Westernized clientele were quick to adjust to the new musical knowledge obtained via MTV. In short, satellite television became a powerful new referent for the development of global youth culture. Meanwhile, the informal circuit of recording one’s own music, giving private parties, exchanging magazines and video cassettes, hanging up posters, and playing amateur rock music consolidated the intertextual pleasures that the global youth experienced in their consumption of Western pop music.

It is this informal circuit of subcultural spaces and practices that needs to be considered in order to map both the ‘local’ and ‘global’ character of young people’s musical practices. ‘Why is the literature on pop music, like that of other genres, other media, so often empty of cars . . .?’, asks Jody Berland (1992: 39). My first example of the reception of Western pop music concerns cars.

Joyrides

. . . a speculative experience of the world; being outside of these things that stay there, detached and absolute, that leave us without having anything to do with this departure themselves; being deprived of them, surprised by their ephemeral and quiet strangeness. . . . [O]ne has to get out: there are
only lost paradises. . . . History begins again feverishly. . . . There comes to an end the Robinson Crusoe adventure of the traveling noble soul that could believe itself intact because it was surrounded by glass and iron.

(de Certeau, 1984: 111–14)

The experience of traveling in motorized transport is unique and thoroughly modern. The world outside passes like a movie, what counts is the illusion of separation, cursory immunity. The greater the difference between the comfort of inside and the tumult of outside, the more the passenger is temporarily freed from the fragmentary forces at work without. Obviously, the passenger is only a veritable flâneur if the journey becomes a goal in itself. For urban youth, driving around without clear destination has been a practice embedded with much sub-cultural meaning ever since the car became widely available as a consumer product. By driving away from parents and school, the car provides the possibility of creating own space and time. The car is fetishized, specially by boys, who integrate the technics and aesthetics of the thing into their sexual culture.

And since the car stereo has been widely available, driving around became driving on a soundtrack. In the car, you play music for friends. It can be played louder than at home, and loud music urges the driver to speed up, and speeding up makes the outside seem even more hectic. In the car, you can smoke and drink and make out. For the wealthy youth of Bangalore, driving around is a very urban, very modern, very non-Indian matter.

‘[Machines] are brought down to earth (“mediatised”) by being made to function as differential elements – as markets of identity and difference – organised into meaningful relations through their location within cultural/ideological codes’, writes Dick Hebdige (1988: 86–7). In Indian cities, motor vehicles symbolize strong classifications of social groups. The Honda Kinetic scooter, for example, appears to be exclusively for upper-class girls and working women. The Indian-made Bajaj scooter, on the contrary, is unfailingly associated with old-fashioned, dull, middle-class males. For years the number of car models sold was limited to four or five. Now, every launching of a new brand in motor vehicles means, for those who can pay, that they can further enter the prosperity, mobility and diversity that they coveted through Western media texts, but couldn’t buy. The Ambassador, that mammoth of Indian stagnation, that apex of statist distaste and inefficiency, has become a curiosity.

So the industrial connotations of cars in 1990s India were already powerful socio-cultural markers. But the practical use of vehicles by rich youth stresses even more the symbolic distinction from other classes. Rich youth have enough time and money to enjoy driving around – petrol is relatively costly. Rich youth can afford a bribe when any problems should arise with the cops. Rich youth give a cultural (as opposed to functional) meaning to these rides through what they do inside the car: playing Western pop, gossiping, flirting, preparing themselves for the evening out. They don’t just go somewhere.
As soon as boys get their driving licence at the age of 18 (and even before that, as in India you need not be too particular about these things), driving fast becomes an indisputable part of their machismo. Now, Indians are not really known for their disciplined driving behaviour, but young men turn fast driving into a sport. Anyone who has knowledge of the hotchpotch on Indian streets knows that this could easily mean suicide. The music playing in cars adds to the excitement. And then there’s the booze too (in India, there is no ‘don’t drink and drive’ as yet). Don’t underestimate the thrills you can get from driving around wildly in an Indian city. You redefine urban space as your amusement park. But unlike de Certeau’s train passenger or Baudelaire’s flâneur, the sights of the town barely raise your interest. Urban space is rendered abstract through the loud music, air-conditioning, tainted and closed windows, high speeds, and the animated conversations within. Outside, there’s noise, dust, stench, heat, mass, misery that cannot permeate through the ‘glass and iron’. Richard Sennett says of the flâneur’s submission into urban space:

Submission passes through power’s magic lantern so that the image illuminated on the city’s streets does not irritate the eye. Submission appears on the streets as detachment. If what one sees hurts, one can always keep walking [or even better, driving].

(1990: 131)

Girls in the car do not have to fear the gaze of poorer men, which they detest so much. The music is audible outside, but muffled. If a beggar or cow tries to get a glimpse of what is going on inside they stare into their own reflection.

Driving around in a cooled ivory tower. A solipsistic inside that coheres when you know that because you’re there, you’re eluding something. Often, young Bangaloreans skip school, homework, tuition or family get-togethers to go for a ride. And thus, at least phenomenologically, the conspicuous consumption of the car creates a break-away from everything that the old India stands for: poverty, chaos, ignorance, useless education, duty, fanaticism, collectivism, sexual segregation, sluggishness and the absence of style.

Mid-day parties

The subcultural creativity of the global youth in Bangalore is perhaps most apparent in the phenomenon of the so-called mid-day parties. To celebrate a birthday or some other occasion, up to a lakh (100,000 rupees) is spent among a few extremely rich friends to put up a party, often in a fancy hotel. Guests get in with invites and pay nothing for the music, drink and food. Mid-day parties, and private parties in general, are welcome supplements to the meagre supply of nightclubs in Bangalore (due to the unrealistically tight regulation, only two
during my research in 1996). The reason why mid-day parties are mid-day is that during the afternoon it is far easier for teenagers to lie. Girls especially always need to legitimize their absence at home.

I witnesses a second example of the spatial separation that accompanies the emergence of global youth culture in India at a mid-day party one afternoon in Whitefield, a former colonial suburb of Bangalore. Resorts are being built everywhere around the metropolis for the upper classes, who want to flee from urban suffocation (the Garden City has little garden left). This particular party was organized in the front yard of a well-kept country-house. As is often the case, no-one seemed to know exactly whom the party was for – most are summoned by Bangalore’s thriving phone culture, ‘Hey I’ve heard there’s a party somewhere in Whitefield’. Bangalore’s favourite DJ Ivan was spinning R&B, house-pop and Euro-trance on the veranda. Smirnoff vodka and Gordon’s gin were available in the improvised bar (a Maruti jeep). The lawn served as dance floor and the weather was wonderful.

Dressing up in India is traditionally connected to religious ceremony. If boys and girls dress up to go out to pubs, clubs and parties, this has little to do with the formal, vernacular dressing up they do to please their parents. Because of India’s puritan identification of ‘vernacular’ and ‘decent’, casual and party clothing in Western style means, in itself, an eroticization of the youthful body and a challenge to traditional authority. Girls in T-shirts and jeans on Indian streets often have to irritably acknowledge the androcentrism of India’s puritan discourse as they defy the looks of the poorer and more traditional boys. Though India’s sexism lies deep, it is certainly realigned by young women’s sexualized and gender-conscious practices of dancing, dressing up and shopping. It is striking to see how a certain feminine narcissism develops after the school uniform and the protectiveness/meddlesomeness of male family members, having been incorporated, are suddenly considered obsolete at 18–20.

Puritan discourse is incompatible with the youth’s definition of the situation at a party. Some boys enjoy exhibiting themselves too – of course, T-shirts were removed from the broadest chests first, there in Whitefield. The pleasure of being looked at interacted with the pleasure of dancing. Sexy clothes are pretty pointless if you don’t let yourself be admired from all sides while dancing. Hence the comparison was made quite quickly, both by myself and by the participants, between the Whitefield pool party and the MTV programme The Grind. The Grind is basically a collection of good-looking youths in swimwear, dancing suggestively in a summer setting, all trying their best to attract the camera lens. Only, in Whitefield there wasn’t any camera.

There were peepers, though. Over the surrounding walls, poor workers from neighbouring farms were watching the party bustle. An interesting, perverse form of exhibitionism/voyerism came into being. The global youth knew very well that they were being watched, that these local others had probably never heard such loud pop music, never seen so much liquor and tight
tops together before. They knew that every three free-of-charge vodkas they drank added up to the weekly salary of the peeping Toms behind the wall. But they feigned an indifference for the fascination they produced amongst the lower classes, just as they do when they drive around. They feigned, because they were thoroughly aware of the visibility of their Western fashion, music, behaviour and wealth. To a certain extent this visibility is inevitable in a modern space like Bangalore. And provoking culture shock can be fun for both sides. Yet, the workings of power in this situation are undeniable. There was, in Whitefield, an ambiguous balance between exhibitionism and voyeurism, a delicate consensus on the relationality of power; the poor devils could also have been rudely chased away.

The presence of the local other could not be fully bracketed. The rich kids knew they were still in Whitefield, Bangalore, India. Not in The Grind. Global youth constitute, through/in the intertextual and corporeal reception of Western music, a subcultural space outside the traditional spaces of family, school, work, poverty, bureaucracy and religion. But simultaneously, they are fully conscious of the fact that the spatial demarcation is not impermeable, that everybody (every body) who turns her/his back to cultural hegemonies is prone to be looked at. Especially in the bright sunlight of Whitefield.

The politics of youth culture is a politics of metaphor: it deals with the currency of signs and is, thus, always ambiguous. For the subcultural ‘milieu’ has been constructed underneath the authorised discourses, in the face of the multiple disciplines of the family, the school and the workplace. Subculture forms up space between surveillance and the evasion of surveillance, it translates the fact of being under scrutiny into the pleasure of being watched. It is a hiding in the light.

(Hebdige, 1988: 35)

Indian modernity

The geography of modernity is a complex affair. Modernization of the Third World was definitely based on the colonial implementation of Western conceptions of itself and the rest of the world (cf. Said, 1978). But it does not follow that Third World modernity is entirely ‘their’ adaptation to ‘our’ occidentalisms and orientalisms. On the contrary, when imaginary geographies diffuse, they articulate with local traditions and societies. It might be argued that post-colonial modernities are fed as much by oriental orientalisms and occidentalisms as by occidental orientalisms and occidentalisms. Thus, the way global youth in Bangalore construct their sense of place within India’s modernity and globalization can only be understood by interpreting their images of the West within India’s specific geohistory (cf. Rose, 1995). As India modernizes (becomes ‘Western’), these images are then transposed onto their own country. In the resulting mental map,
there seems to be room for two Indias: one local/traditional/oriental India, which annoys them, and one global/modern/occidental India, of which they are proud and to which they feel they belong. Some of the subcultural orientalizations and occidentalizations involved are illustrated in table 1 (see Saldanha, 1997).

Indian modernity conflates both ‘local’ history and ‘global’ scapes. The actual geography of Indian modernity is evaluated by urban youth with a dichotomous set of orientalisms and occidentalisms. Global youth think of Indian institutions as backward, hopeless and ugly, and they think of the West as dynamic, well-organized and tasteful. This is their imaginary geography, although in important ways it might resemble the imaginary geographies constructed in the West. As my brief ethnographic examples indicated, the reception of Western pop music and concomitant development of a global identity have to be seen in the light of this imaginary geography. Young cosmopolitans appropriate imported culture to coin difference with what has lost traditional legitimacy: state, schooling, religion and history (cf. Hannerz, 1990). For instance, if global youth identify with/through Western pop music, they disidentify with Indian musical forms. Indian classical music, regional folk musics, devotional singing, school brass bands and Hindi film music are found to be archaic, annoying or insipid. On the other hand, ‘neo-ethnic’ revivals in Indian rock/jazz and diasporic genres like bhangramuffin or Asian drum ‘n bass hardly receive any attention in India (cf. Lipsitz, 1994: 126–31; Sharma et al., 1996).

A critic such as Herbert Schiller (1976) might call Bangalore’s youth, their modern imaginary geography and subsequent post-traditional identity effects of American cultural imperialism. Three objections can be made drawing on the ethnographies above. First, these kids are creative agents of change, although their everyday tactics might well articulate with multinational strategy (cf. de Certeau, 1984 on tactic and strategy). Second, these kids are not anti-India, only selected parts of India. They would not want to emigrate to fully satisfy their

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<td><strong>global India</strong></td>
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<td>institutional religion</td>
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<td>stuck in the past</td>
<td>look to the future</td>
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<td>corruption</td>
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<td>traditionalism: caste, religion</td>
<td>cosmopolitanism: lifestyle, taste</td>
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hunger for Westernness. Theirs is an identity existing in the dialectic between impact of the West and Indian tradition, a dialectic not subsuming into a synthesis but into something intrinsically different: something perpetually in-between. Three, the kids fully acknowledged this in-betweenness, their subsisting Indianness, in the discussions I had with them (Saldanha, 1997). So, even though Bangalore’s elite youth culture itself builds upon a refuting of tradition and an othering of local culture, when probed about their ambivalent modernity the kids become reflexive of the fact that their constructions of a culturally dual India have to be continually negotiated in practical and experiential reality. This negotiation is something Schiller is not likely to notice. ‘Global modernity’ does not exist; there are only global modernities (King, 1995). Modernity in India, consisting of phenomena like youth culture, multinational consumer culture and hi-tech optimism, is ‘global’ not because it straightforwardly connects to some pan-planetary political economy or structure of feeling, but because it is translocal (Appadurai, 1997). The translocal musical practices of Bangalorean youth differ considerably from the translocal musical practices of ‘global youth’ in Sydney, Brussels and Nairobi. More generally, processes of globalization and modernization are necessarily place-specific (Massey, 1998). The reason why I have to use Western theorists such as Lefebvre, de Certeau and Hebdige to understand aspects of non-Western modernity is simply that non-Western modernity has hardly been theorized as yet (though see Miller, 1994). ‘Their’ imaginings of the world (their occidentalisms and orientalisms) and the corresponding social politics cannot be reduced to how ‘we’ have been naming and experiencing modernity as a purely Western condition. This should be the prime motive for making a start in theorizing and analyzing other modernities, other imaginary geographies.

Music, space, identity

The everyday practices around the reception of music from elsewhere turn imaginary geographies into real ones. As the rich kids in Bangalore identify with some spaces more than others, an inside/outside dichotomy comes into being – from music to space to identity. Music practices territoralize subcultural identity (Grossberg, 1997), and the resulting subcultural spaces are actual and metaphorical gaps in the Indian cultural hegemony. Inside the gaps, there is the productive consumption and experience of global youth culture. Inside there is translocality, a connection to elsewhere via sound, body and capital. Outside are the local others: parents, puritans, politicians, officials, intellectuals. Outside there are also the poor, who lack the economic, social and cultural capital to consume Western music in the ways I have been describing. For all these outsiders, global youth culture is something strange, incomprehensible, ostentatious or even threatening. Especially to India’s own modernist advocates of the cultural
imperialism thesis, global youth’s ambivalence stands in the way of imagining India as a purely Indian community (Nandy, 1983: 70–6).

To conclude, there are three closely related remarks I’d like to make about the music-space-identity processes in Bangalore. First, as I said, globalization and modernization are neither about a McLuhanesque world-wide community getting to grips with a common human essence, nor the homogenizing implication of the expansion of Western capital. They are geographically contingent. I have not provided any comparative evidence here, but I hope to have shown that at least in Bangalore, the particular imaginations and spatializations involved in the appropriation of Western pop music are particular to Bangalore, meaning, they are as much ‘local’ as they are ‘global’ — they are translocal. Being sensitive to the place-specificity of space means researching how people’s ‘tapping into’ global processes reflect their place’s historical translocality in economy, psychology and culture (Massey, 1998).

Second, the advent of global youth culture in Bangalore has a profound political dimension. Western pop music and intertextually related video, fashion, cinema, advertising and shopping are perceived to be miles apart from the local nuisance, from Third World India. The consumption of Western pop music — curiously, popular culture in the West — accentuates the various kinds of capital rich young people accumulate, and also disconnects them spatially and socially from ‘local’ India. Local India becomes their constitutive outside. A lower middle-class Bangalorean can no doubt listen to Madonna tapes, wear fake jeans and enjoy StarTV; s/he too can work on a translocal identity. But the rich kids watch Madonna on DVD, wear real Levi’s and understand the difficult English words on StarTV. They can afford a party in the Holiday Inn. Interlocal locals are just aberrant locals. Also within places is globalization an uneven process, finding expression along the politics of class, cultural competence, gender and mobility. ‘Global youth’ can only be thought separate from ‘local culture’ because of a higher degree of politico-economic and psychocultural translocality.

Global youth claim space through pleasure, somewhat in the fashion Henri Lefebvre (1968) conceived of how the working class would attain their urban identity, their droit à la ville. Only, in Bangalore, these ‘ludic spaces’ of resistance can apparently articulate with hegemonies on other levels: the classic hegemony, or the international hegemony of Western pop music. While ‘turning outward’ is highly valued in the ‘multicultural’ West (Sennett, 1990), anti-local senses of place like those of the privileged youth of Bangalore may create new insides. New insides aren’t something India, with her long history of civic, socio-economic and religious fragmentation, particularly needs.

My third and final point is theoretical. The critical study of music, space and identity means studying the interplay between three elements. First, imaginings of places through music — not just one’s own place, but other places as well. Second, crucially, the situated practices of music, rather than its musicological ‘content’. And finally, even more crucially, the politics that arise when music
moves and is given meaning in actual places. Geography of music and ethnomusicology have too often limited their analyses to the diffusion of musical treats in measurable space alone (e.g. Carney, 1987), or alternately presented music as a purely local, uncontested cultural phenomenon (e.g. Nettl and Bohlman, 1991). Recent popular music scholars such as Kong (1995), Lipsitz (1994), Mitchell (1996) and Straw (1991) raise interesting issues on music, globalization and identity politics. However, they hardly spend any words on music’s empirical spatializations. Music does not just exist ‘in’ space and refer ‘to’ space, the space of music is produced and produces identity and politics through its corporealization (cf. Lefebvre, 1972). Berland (1992), Cohen (1998), Grossberg (1997) and Ingham et al. (1999) do conceive music as an embodied production of space, but fail to tell us exactly how this embodiment interacts with music’s translocal traces and imaginings to bring forth a spatial politics.

Especially in globalizing places like Bangalore, where music must be studied within complicated postcolonial matrices of tradition and modernity, the multileveled caprices of power and pleasure can only be fully appreciated when we turn to the actual sites where music attains its meaning. Rather than presuming to be a guideline as to how this research is to be undertaken, the ethnography presented here simply served to point towards this possible line of enquiry.

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Notes

1 With ‘real geographies’ I mean the spatial organization of power relations and networking of places (cf. Massey, 1998). I use ‘imaginary geographies’ to refer to the cultural imaginings of the world, primarily of the West as home and the East as elsewhere, thus creating exclusionary identity (Said, 1978). I prefer ‘imaginary’ to Said’s ‘imaginative’ because it has less of an intentional and artistic feel to it.

2 The two readers presented here derive from a larger project in which I mapped the emergence of global youth culture in Bangalore in various socio-cultural domains (Saldanha, 1997). The research was carried out during autumn 1996. Bangalore is the capital of the southern state Karnataka. One of the fastest growing cities in Asia and still retaining some of its suburban past, it boasts a far more liberal and industrious (‘modern’) sense of place than Bombay, New Delhi, Madras or Calcutta. Being half-Indian and having lived in Bangalore as
a teenager, I was able to understand the specifically Indian occidentalisms and orientalisms involved in the appropriations of western commodities. Many of the young people I interviewed and most of the phenomena I observed were therefore not new to me. My research problem was to interpret the imaginary geographies of globalization through the eyes of that cosmopolitan upper class, which can identify itself fully with the cultural commodities India’s renewed capitalism offers. ‘Local others’, therefore, is more an imagination of young cosmopolitans than an objective category of people unaffected by globalization (cf. Hannerz, 1990). I am not interested in the ways these ‘local others’ might experience globalization.

3 Finding aesthetic and/or historical reasons for why it is that these sounds, and not others, found their way to the Indian audience lay beyond the research problematic of the project. Rather, at this point, I want to treat the limited choice in music during protectionism as a given background against which the proliferation of choice brought by satellite television has to be evaluated.

4 MTV and Channel [V] also triggered a new music video industry in India, which is closely connected to the visual grammar and marketing of Bollywood movies. Though interesting, I will not be considering this development here.

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